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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I offer an answer to one of the most important questions
about authoritarian politics today: why do dictatorships hold elections? In order to
answer this broad question, I study the causes and consequences of elections as well
as the role of elections in nondemocratic settings. First, I develop a theory about
the causes of elections in dictatorships, which is based on the different threats that
dictatorships face and the different goals that they have in order to lessen or avoid
these threats. I argue that dictatorships opt for elections for the effective executive
if they need to avoid violent removal. In contrast, dictatorships begin elections for
a national legislature if they seek to maintain the unity and cohesion of elites in the
ruling circle and/or to coopt elites from outside of the regime. Second, I present
a theory about the consequences of elections in dictatorships. I contend that two
seemingly competing effects of elections are mutually complementary. Individual
elections can create a momentum for regime change, leading to the collapse of dic-
tatorships and democratic transitions. At the same time, once dictatorships survive
elections, election results convey useful information for the purpose of cooptation
and send a signal that deters future challenges to the regime. Tests of my theory
on a sample of dictatorships after World War II show robust support for my theory
about the causes and consequences of elections. Finally, I revisit the information
collection role of elections in nondemocratic settings. I theorize that elections can
be either informative or less informative depending on the strategic decisions that
major opposition parties make. I develop a formal theory to describe this causal
mechanism. An important implication of my theory is that informative elections
are associated with post-electoral redistribution of goods and patronage while less
ii
informative elections in which major opposition parties boycott elections are not. I
test this implication by using original data collected from Serbia in 1990s and present
results that are consistent with my theory.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Scholars and policy makers have long thought that, in nondemocratic countries,1
political institutions such as legislatures, parties, and elections are merely window-
dressing and thereby play no role in important matters such as democratization
and the survival of dictators (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Hermet 1978). This
assertion comes from the view that dictatorships lack an independent authority that
can reinforce agreements among key political players. As a result, violence is the
ultimate arbiter of conflicts among them (Svolik 2012). More recently, however,
political scientists have revisited this conventional wisdom. They have found that the
establishment of legislatures and political parties entails both costs and benefits to
dictators, and therefore are the product of careful strategic calculations. Institutions
matter even in dictatorships (Gandhi 2008; North and Weingast 1989; Root 1994;
Svolik 2012). Does this perspective also apply to elections in nondemocratic settings?
In my dissertation, I try to answer an old, but increasingly important question:
Why do nondemocratic regimes hold elections? Both the causes and the consequences
of elections in nondemocratic settings are puzzling. On the one hand, there are cases
where elections appear to cause breakdowns of some dictatorships: some elections
result in the unexpected opposition victory while others induce popular upheaval
against the regime because of their unfairness. Those instances echo the view that
“liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium: the halfway house does
not stand” (Huntington 1991, 174–175). On the other hand, there are cases where
elections seem to contribute to the survival of other dictatorships by generating
support for the regimes. Those cases make us believe that dictators “are so successful
1Throughout the dissertation, terms such as nondemocracies, nondemocratic regimes, dictator-
ships, and autocracies are used interchangeably.
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at using elections to perpetuate their rule” (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 416). These
arguments highlight dilemmas dictators face when deciding whether or not to hold
elections. From a scholarly perspective, the question can be phrased as: how can
we make sense of elections in nondemocratic settings and incorporate them into our
explanations of the survival of dictatorships?
I propose that in order to answer the broad questions outlined above, we need
to answer three more narrowly-defined questions. The rationale behind this strategy
is that this broad question encompasses a set of different variations that I need to
explore both theoretically and empirically. First, when and why do some dictator-
ships start holding elections? This is a question which has been understudied in the
recent, emerging literature of elections in nondemocratic settings, but is a question
which needs to be answered in order to fully understand those elections.
Second, once elections are introduced in dictatorships, do they help regime sur-
vival or do they cause democratization? In contrast to the first question, there has
been a lot of attention paid to this question in the recent literature. In brief, a grow-
ing number of studies have produced two competing views on the role of elections.
One body of the literature emphasizes a regime-subverting role and a democratizing
role of elections. Another body of the research contends that elections play a regime-
sustaining role. The question that I attempt to answer is whether these two views
are mutually exclusive or complementary with each other.
Lastly, how do elections in nondemocratic settings impact dictators’ policy choices?
One of the key mechanisms that forms the basis for ideas about the regime-sustaining
role of elections is the information collection role of elections and the resulting post-
electoral redistribution of goods and patronage. Past studies demonstrated evidence
that supports the idea of informative elections, but this evidence is based on case
studies. Therefore, the generalizability of this perspective is in question.
2
In sum, by breaking down the big question into these three separate ones, I will
develop a deeper understanding of the role of elections in nondemocratic settings as
well as the causes and consequences of elections in nondemocracies. In the three
Chapters that follow, I seek to provide an answer to each question.
In Chapter 2, I develop a theory about the causes of elections in dictatorships.
This theory is based on the different threats that dictatorships face and the different
goals that they have to lessen or avoid these threats. I argue that dictatorships opt for
elections for the effective executive if they need to avoid violent removal. This is the
case because holding those elections works as an institutionalized means of leadership
succession. In contrast, dictatorships begin elections for a national legislature if they
seek to maintain the unity and cohesion of elites in the ruling circle and/or to coopt
elites from outside of the regime. Tests of my theory on a sample of dictatorships
after World War II show robust support for my theory about the causes of contested
elections.
In Chapter 3, I present a theory about the consequences of elections in dicta-
torships. I contend that two seemingly competing effects of elections are mutually
complementary. Individual elections can create a momentum for regime change,
leading to the collapse of dictatorships and democratic transitions. This happens
because elections function as a focal point in which dissatisfied ruling elites split and
defect from the regime, opposition forces coordinate and coalesce, and these actors
challenge the regime. At the same time, once dictatorships survive elections, elec-
tion results convey useful information for the purpose of cooptation and send a signal
that deters future challenges to the regime. Since these mechanisms are unique to
dictatorships that hold elections, those regimes can sustain their existence longer
than their counterparts that do not hold elections. Tests of my theory on a sample
of dictatorships after World War II provide robust evidence of my theory about the
3
consequences of elections.
In Chapter 4, I revisit the information collection role of elections in nondemo-
cratic settings. I theorize that elections can be either informative or less informative
depending on the strategic decisions that major opposition parties make. I develop
a formal theory to describe this causal mechanism. An important implication of my
theory is that informative elections are associated with post-electoral redistribution
of goods and patronage while less informative elections in which major opposition
parties boycott elections are not. I test this implication by using original data col-
lected from Serbia in 1990s and present results that are consistent with my theory.
I conclude in Chapter 5 with a discussion of my future agenda and possible
extensions to this dissertation research.
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2. CAUSES OF ELECTIONS IN NONDEMOCRACIES
2.1 Introduction
Although elections in nondemocratic settings had long been denied any signif-
icance (Hermet 1978, 1), recent research shows that these elections play a regime-
sustaining role (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Schedler 2013). In many ways, multi-
party elections appear to help the survival of dictators through the information that
they provide on allies, voters, and adversaries (Blaydes 2011; Cox 2009; Magaloni
2006; Malesky and Schuler 2011), communicating the invincibility of the dictators
in order to deter challenges (Geddes 2006; Rozenas 2010), and co-opting elites and
dissidents through the (re)distribution of patronage and goods (Blaydes 2011; Lust-
Okar 2008; Magaloni 2006). In fact, a growing number of elections, albeit unfree
and unfair in varying degrees, have been taking place in nondemocracies since the
end of the Cold War (Magaloni 2008, 734; Ottaway 2003; Roessler and Howard 2009;
Schedler 2013, 2–5). If elections are a useful tool for dictators, however, why do some
dictators seem to avoid them? Put differently, when and why do dictators decide to
hold elections? These are the questions I attempt to answer in this Chapter.
What we know from previous research is that elections play two different roles.
That is, in addition to the regime-sustaining role, they might play a regime-subverting
or democratizing role (Donno 2013; Huntington 1991; Lindberg 2009b). Because elec-
tions can be both beneficial and costly to dictators, we are left uncertain about what
eventually makes dictators hold elections. In order to fill the gap in the literature, I
propose a new theory on the causes of elections in nondemocratic settings. If dicta-
tors’ preference of political survival and the theorized role of nondemocratic elections
are not sufficient to explain when and why dictators hold elections, I argue that we
5
need to look for other possible explanations. A crucial building block of my theory
is a less-pronounced assumption in the literature that dictators prefer a peaceful exit
when they leave the office. I further contend that consideration of this insight leads
us to make distinctions between types of elections—elections of the effective execu-
tive and legislative elections—that have been largely neglected in previous research.
Since those who get elected differ between these two types of elections, they play
different roles with respect to the dictators’ possible mode of exit.
In the sections that follow, I begin with a brief review of the literature on the
role of elections in nondemocratic settings. I then offer a new theory on the causes of
elections that distinguishes between elections for the effective executive and legisla-
tive elections. In the third section, I summarize the data set that I constructed to
test my theory. Fourth, I present findings from my models of the causes of elections.
The last section concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
At the core of the recent scholarship on authoritarian politics is the idea that
dictators’ primary goal is their survival. Theoretical accounts have been developed
as to how elections function in nondemocratic settings with respect to the regime
and the leadership survival.
Holding multiparty elections is suggested to play two different regime-sustaining
roles — an informational role and a constraining role. These two roles work in tandem
and dispel concerns about the threats to dictators. Elections are informative if they
reveal information about the loyal supporters and opponents. That information is
then used to shape effective and efficient (re)distribution of goods and patronage
(Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Lust-Okar 2008). Another aspect of the informational
role is called the information communication role (Rozenas 2012, 4). If dictators win
6
elections with a wide margin, it will signal the invincibility of the regime (Brownlee
2007, 3; Simpser 2013). Elections with high turnout might indicate that there is
little to no latent support for opposition forces that can be mobilized, signaling
public acquiescence (Geddes 2006, 17–19). Hence, although elections are often seen
as a key vehicle of democratic politics, they have a deterrence value and contribute
to the survival of dictators through these informational roles.
Multiparty elections play a constraining role in two different ways (Schedler 2013,
144–145). On the one hand, they constrain dictators and facilitate power-sharing
between a dictator and his allies. Since it is extremely costly to arbitrarily close the
electoral arena, elections provide “a credible exit option” for dissatisfied elites in the
inner circles (Magaloni 2008, 728). If dictators fail to meet the policy demand of
their allies, those allies can threaten the rulers by defecting and organizing their own
electoral force. Hence, policy concession between the dictator and his allies is readily
achieved in this setting as it becomes more difficult for dictators to renege on their
promise. On the other hand, holding elections also constrains adversaries (Anderson
1996, 33; Schedler 2013, 144–145). By offering an institutionalized means to publicly
criticize the regime and express discontent, elections delegitimize violent means to
depose dictators. In other words, elections replace bullets with ballots (Schedler 2013,
35). In sum, constraints generated by multiparty elections facilitate cooperation
within the ruling circles and dampen non-electoral challenges by dissidents who are
able to mobilize their supporters at the polls.
Although multiparty elections in nondemocratic settings might reduce uncer-
tainty and play a regime-sustaining role, they introduce a new type of uncertainty,
namely “electoral uncertainty” (Schedler 2013, 35). At the core of this regime-
sustaining role is the informational role of elections (Schedler 2013, 145) since credible
information is necessary for credible communication and efficient use of it. However,
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elections might not always be as informative as they are supposed to be. In order for
them to reveal the geographic distribution of support and opposition to the regime, it
is necessary that opposition parties compete. If they are not present in the electoral
contest —for example, if opposition parties strategically boycott elections in order to
discredit the legitimacy (Beaulieu 2006)—, elections cannot reveal much information
and thus provide little help for the shaping of (re)distribution policies (Seki 2012).
Furthermore, the information communication role of elections is severely condi-
tioned by electoral outcomes. On the one hand, as long as the regime party dominates
the legislature by securing a majority with high margins, elections are likely to sig-
nal the invincibility of the regime (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 407). On the other
hand, if opposition parties are electorally viable and show a real chance of victory,
they can undermine the perception of invincibility, signaling the weakness of the
regime (Donno 2013, 706). For this reason, holding multiparty elections can render
nondemocratic regimes unstable (Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1991).
Constraints generated by elections are a double-edged sword. Since elections
admit societal pluralism and empower adversaries (Schedler 2013, 62), they might
invite dissension and splits within the ruling circles (Hale 2005, 141; Way 2008). The
end result might not simply be regime turbulence and limited liberalization, but even
democratization (Lindberg 2009; Schedler 2002; Teorell 2010; Teorell and Hadenius
2009). Moreover, elections do not necessarily rule out the possibility of non-electoral
violent movements that are aimed at ousting dictators. When dictators manipulate
election results in favor of their survival, they provide good reasons for opposition
forces to mobilize dissatisfied masses, which can lead to large-scale popular upheaval
(Beissinger 2007; Tucker 2007).
In Table 2.1, I summarize the different arguments about costs and benefits from
multiparty or multi-candidate elections with respect to the leadership and regime
8
Table 2.1: Costs and Benefits of Holding Elections in Nondemocracies
Benefits Costs
Informational Role
(1) Information Collection Revealed information Elections can be
facilitates co-optation. uninformative.
(2) Information Communication Overwhelming victory Election results are not
signals invincibility. perfectly predetermined.
Constraining Role
(1) Constraints on Dictators Elections facilitate “Exit” option under-
credible power-sharing. mines elite cohesion.
(2) Constraints on Dissidents Elections delegitimize Electoral fraud can
violent challenges. motivate violent ouster.
survival. It reveals that electoral benefits are not always guaranteed: Informa-
tion collection and information communication through elections are not necessarily
achieved because there are uninformative elections and election results are not per-
fectly predetermined. Moreover, the same factors that generate benefits can also be
the sources of subversion and instability: constraints on dictators might facilitate
credible power-sharing while they can also cause elite disunity. Elections might dele-
gitimize non-electoral challenges by dissidents, but fraudulent elections can bolster
their dissatisfaction, which leads to violent popular upheaval. Therefore, although
we can claim that the decision of holding elections should be the product of careful
strategic calculations by dictators and their allies, the literature remains inconclusive
about when and why dictators decide to hold elections.
9
2.3 Theory
Past studies reveal that holding multiparty elections in nondemocratic settings
entails both costs and benefits with respect to the regime survival. They are in-
formative when we scrutinize how elections (do not) work for the stability of non-
democracies. However, this does not mean that the literature can fully explain when
and why dictators decide to hold those elections. Because elections might have both
positive and negative effects on regime survival, the literature remains inconclusive
about their causes.
In addition to this theoretical challenge, we face a neglected, but empirically im-
portant issue about the types of elections that nondemocratic regimes hold. That
is, if we turn to examine when and why multiparty elections have been held in
nondemocracies, we immediately notice that, in reality, there are different types
of elections such as presidential elections and parliamentary elections and the exis-
tence of those elections varies considerably across nondemocratic regimes.1 On one
extreme, neither presidential nor parliamentary elections were held at all in Chile
under the rule by Augusto Pinochet from 1973 to 1989.2 On the other extreme,
multi-candidate presidential elections along with multiparty parliamentary elections
have kept elected Alexander Lukashenko since 1994 in Belarus. In between these
two extremes lie countries such as Zimbabwe. Following the parliamentary election
in 1980, Robert Mugabe became prime minister and started his rule in newly in-
dependent Zimbabwe. When the position of the premiership was abolished in 1987
1Another type of elections is local elections. Since the past research usually discuss the role of
national elections, I do not include local elections in the analyses that follow. However, given that
there are countries such as China where only local elections have been held, this type of elections
needs more attention in future research.
2After being appointed as President by the military junta in December 1974, Pinochet declared
in July 1975, perceiving that he had consolidated his rule, that “I will die, my successor will die,
but there will never be elections again!” (Mun˜oz (2008, 66) cited by Rozenas (2012, 2)).
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Mugabe assumed the presidency, and his tenure has been subject to popular direct
votes since 1990. Despite the variation in the types of elections and the timing at
which they become contested, the literature does not offer clues about which elections
are chosen.
In contrast to the previous research that draws no clear line between the types
of elections in nondemocratic settings, I argue that the distinction should be made
between them in order to better explain and understand the decision of holding elec-
tions. In this Chapter, I propose and focus on two types of elections: elections of
the effective executive and legislative elections. Elections of the effective executive
choose dictators and can take the form of multi-candidate presidential elections when
dictators assume the presidency or multiparty parliamentary elections if dictators’
title is premier. I do not use the term “presidential elections” because not all presi-
dential elections necessarily elect effective rulers in nondemocracies.3 By legislative
elections, I mean multiparty national parliamentary elections.4 Those elections do
not select dictators. Instead, they elect the members of the ruling coalition as leg-
islators. The distinction between these two types of elections is made not only for
the purpose of better representing empirically observed heterogeneity in nondemo-
cratic elections, but also for theoretical reasons that I discuss below. In brief, I argue
that the different types of elections correspond with different objectives that dicta-
tors have: On the one hand, elections of the effective executive are held in order
to prevent violent ouster of dictators. On the other hand, legislative elections in
nondemocratic settings are aimed at maintaing elite cohesion and co-option of elites
3One example is found in Nicaragua during the reign of Anastasio Somoza Garcia (effective
ruler in 1937–1956). Lenoardo Argu¨ello (in office from May 1 to May 26, 1947) was the president
elected through multi-candidate presidential elections in 1947, but was a mere puppet. Likewise,
Rene´ Schick Gutie´rrez (in office from May 1, 1963 to August 3, 1966) served as the president, but
was deemed a puppet president of Luis Somoza Debayle (effective ruler in 1956–1967).
4If a country has two houses, I refer to the elections of the lower chamber.
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outside of the ruling coalition.
Elections of the Effective Executive
As I mentioned earlier, dictators’ primary goal is their survival. However, the-
oretical accounts that are driven by consideration of this objective fail to explain
when and why some dictators opt for contested elections. If the desire for political
survival is not sufficient to provide full understandings of the causes of elections in
nondemocratic settings, we need to look for another objective. I argue that dictators’
preference for peaceful exit from office is a crucial building block. The way in which
dictators leave office varies considerably: some dictators pass away peacefully, find
successors, or stay in politics, while others are assassinated, jailed, or exiled by their
challengers. That is, the mode of exit of dictators is largely divided into peaceful
exit and violent removal. And it will be straightforward to assume that dictators
prefer to leave the office peacefully in case they have to do so.
Although past research on nondemocratic elections has not paid sufficient atten-
tion to the mode of exit of dictators, this objective has been the subject of studies
in another body of literature on authoritarian politics (Goemans 2008). Cox (2009)5
is one of the early studies that relates this issue to the decision of holding elections
in nondemocratic settings. In his formal model, a dictator is uncertain about his
rival’s military strength relative to his own since it is the rival’s private information.
Holding elections is considered a way to overcome this informational asymmetry. By
incurring the risk associated with electoral uncertainty, the dictator can observe the
extent to which the rival mobilizes mass support during electoral campaign and learn
about the rival’s military strength.6 One of Cox’s important and empirically testable
5I refer to the version in 2009, but the first manuscript appeared in 2007.
6It is implicitly assumed that a high mobilization capacity of the rival corresponds to high
military strength (Cox 2009, 6).
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propositions is summarized as follows: on the one hand, the absence of elections may
lead to violent ouster of dictators since there is no institutionalized means to depose
dictators, making violence the only way for the leadership change. On the other
hand, holding multiparty elections paves the way for a peaceful exit of dictators
since they can be replaced through elections insofar as they concede and decide to
step down.7 In sum, this study highlights the relationship between dictators’ mode
of exit and the decision of holding elections.
Although Cox (2009, 10) does not make the distinction between elections of the
effective executive and legislative elections, I argue that the manner in which dictators
leave office is closely related to the decision of holding elections for the effective
executive. This is the case because this type of elections is tied with leadership
selection as well as the post-tenure fate of dictators. On the one hand, with respect
to the leadership selection, there are a number of ways by which dictators come into
power: Some of them do so by force (e.g., Idi Amin in Uganda), others are appointed
or selected by their predecessor or party (e.g., Jiang Zemin in China), and still others
are elected through single-candidate presidential elections (e.g, Paul Magloire in
Haiti) or referenda aimed at the approval of the presidency (e.g., Gamal Abdel Nasser
in Egypt). This variation shows that, in some dictatorships, the leadership selection
is highly institutionalized and regulated, which in turn allows for the possibility of
peaceful replacement of dictators without holding multi-candidate elections for the
effective executive. This situation is most pronounced in single-party dictatorships
in which the party exclusively controls the succession process (Magaloni and Kricheli
2010, 127) and dynastic monarchies in which the ruling families negotiate and decide
7Another implication obtained from his model is that, in the equilibrium where single-party
elections are chosen, dictators face no risk of both peaceful and violent removal. It implies that
they are more likely to stay in office by holding single-party elections than in the non-electoral
equilibrium and the multiparty election equilibrium (Cox 2009, 16).
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successors8 (Gandhi 2008, 23). One advantage of these institutional settings is that
they assure peaceful seizure of power and replacement of rulers without running
the electoral risk. It means that without such institutionalization of the leadership
succession, holding contested elections emerges as a solution for dictators to minimize
the risks of violent exit. Two hypotheses follow from this logic:
H1: Dictators in a dynastic monarchy are less likely to hold elections of the effective
executive.
H2: Dictators in a single-party regime are less likely to hold elections of the effective
executive.
On the other hand, Debs’ (2010, 3–4) study of the post-tenure fate of dictators
suggests that dictators with a high military capacity are more likely to be exiled,
jailed or killed for two reasons. First, militarily strong dictators are likely to be
eliminated by a challenger because it is highly probable that a deposed dictator will
come back to challenge the new leader in the future (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003,
343). Second, if they survive and stay as viable political actors in a new regime,
a high capacity for violence allows ousted dictators to secure rents (Geddes 1999).
Therefore, they are likely to be eliminated by their rivals. This argument implies
that dictators with a high military capacity faces the greatest fear of violent removal
by their rivals. Since holding multi-candidate elections of the effective executive is
a way to alleviate this concern and increase the probability of peaceful exit, the
following hypothesis is obtained:
8Dynastic monarchies are defined as the regime in which “members of the ruling families mo-
nopolize the highest state offices” and “[t]he families have developed robust mechanisms for the
distribution of power among their members, particularly during successions, and exercise a thus
far unshakable hegemony over their states” (Herb 1999, 8. Italic is added by the author). Hence,
dynastic monarchies are a distinct form of monarchy from, for example, monarchies in which the
monarch rules alone.
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H3: Dictators with a high military capacity are more likely to hold elections of the
effective executive.
Legislative Elections
In contrast to the elections of the effective executive, the assumption that dic-
tators prefer a peaceful exit to violent ouster will not be relevant to the decision of
holding legislative elections. This is the case because those elections primarily affect
the fate of the regime allies and not the fate of the dictator.
By holding multiparty legislative elections, the membership of the legislature
becomes subject to popular choice. In view of individual “legislators,” their access
to state resources and rents depends on periodic electoral contests and they might
lose office even if the regime prevails.9 This, in turn, allows dictators to keep loyal
and competent elites in their ruling coalition by promoting intra-party competition
(Geddes 2006, 22) as well as inter-party competition.10 Moreover, legislative elections
mean that outsiders in society obtain chances to get access to spoils and rents (Lust-
Okar 2008). Therefore, holding multiparty parliamentary elections helps maintain
elite cohesion and facilitates co-optation of elites from outside of the ruling circle.
It is important to note, however, that holding contested legislative elections is
not the only mechanism through which those benefits can be achieved. Past stud-
ies on authoritarian parties suggest that dominant parties, hegemonic parties, or
regime-sanctioned parties have been used to discipline elites inside the ruling circle
9Not surprisingly, if incumbent legislators perceive that they will not be (re)elected, they are
likely to object to the introduction of multiparty elections. An example is Indonesia in 1940s when
appointed representatives attempted to delay legislations necessary for holding multiparty elections
(Anderson 1996, 28).
10As Schedler (2013, 148) argues, those elites in the ruling coalition will remain loyal and acquiesce
to the extent that their party dominates the legislature and is likely to stay in power. Assuming
that no dictator starts holding legislative elections under the expectation that opposition parties
are likely to gain a large portion of seats in the legislature, what logically follows is that the
aforementioned expected benefits drive dictators to hold multiparty legislative elections. Note that
the decision to quit those elections is another issue that requires further theoretical scrutiny.
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as well as to co-opt outsiders in society. In one view, those parties serve as a vehi-
cle for economic transfers through which perks, privileges, and access to economic
resources are distributed in order to reward those who support the regime (Gandhi
2008, 77–78).11 More importantly, another view claims that if these parties control
appointment, promotion, and succession of regime cadres and prohibit dictatorial
abuse of power, they guarantee the members of the ruling circle a share of power
over the long haul. This, in turn, facilitates credible power-sharing between a dic-
tator and his allies (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010, 127). This type of co-optation
through political exchange of loyalty and political and/or economic rewards is most
pronounced in dictatorships where a single party prevails.
To sum up, in single-party dictatorships, the regime parties work as a selection
mechanism to create loyal and competent followers who diligently work for the sur-
vival of the regime. This means that, as long as dictators are able to or are willing
to establish those parties and monopolize the political sphere,12 they should have
little to no incentive to opt for multiparty parliamentary elections because contested
elections entail risks. Thus, another hypothesis follows:
H4: Single-party dictatorships are less likely to hold legislative elections.
Table 2.2 presents a summary of my theoretical expectations derived from consid-
eration of the three key factors that shape the decision of holding contested elections
in nondemocratic settings. First, institutionalized leadership succession decreases
11One criticism to this idea is that this type of co-optation via the exchange of economic resources
and support is possible even without parties (Svolik 2012, 164).
12It is important to remember that not all dictators are able to establish and capitalize on such
regime sanctioned parties. For example, those parties might arise, at the time of regime creation,
one faction of elites decisively defeats their rivals (Brownlee 2007, 45). Another instance is that
dictatorships whose support base is limited to traditional elites—landed aristocracy and the owner
of capital—might find it less attractive to establish those parties (Svolik 2012, 194–195). This
implies that regime sanctioned parties emerge if dictators need cooperation from the broad range
of society. Thorough analyses of this claim is, however, beyond the scope of this Chapter.
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Table 2.2: Causes of Contested Elections in Nondemocracies
Elections of the Legislative
Causes Effective Executive Elections
Dynastic monarchy −
Single-party regime − −
High military capacity +
Note: “+” indicates positive relationship. “−” indicates negative relationship.
the dictators’ incentive to hold elections for the effective executive, and therefore I
expect that those elections are less likely in dynastic monarchies and single-party
dictatorships. Second, since dictators with high military capacity are likely to be
deposed by force, one solution to this problem, I argue, is to hold contested elections
of the effective executive. Lastly, holding contested legislative elections can facili-
tate elite co-optation. However, dictators do not have an incentive to do so if other
institutional solutions that achieve this goal are already in place. Among others, es-
tablishing a regime-sanctioned party is supposed to play the similar co-optation role.
Thus, I expect that dictators are less likely to hold contested legislative elections in
single-party regimes.
2.4 Research Design and Data
In order to test my theory about the causes of elections in nondemocratic settings,
I constructed a data set that covers dictatorships from 1946 to 2008. These data are
organized by individual countries as the spatial unit and by years as the temporal
unit. Each observation in the data set represents information as of December 31
of the relevant year. The data were assembled in several steps. First, I relied on
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three oft-used data sets on political regime in order to classify countries into either
democracy or dictatorship (Boix et al. 2013; Cheibub et al. 2010; Geddes et al.
2013).13 Table 2.3 summarizes the resulting measure of dictatorships from 1946 to
2008. I excluded from the sample countries that lack the sovereign status. The
sovereign status was obtained from Gleditsch and Ward (1999).14
Within the set of dictatorships, I constructed dichotomous measures of whether
or not elections for the effective executive and legislative elections occurred. I used
a data set on Institutions in Dictatorships collected by Svolik (2012). In this data
set, a variable called executive provides information about the executive selection
and concentration of power.15 Similarly, legislative variable measures the legislative
selection and concentration of power.16 My first dependent variable, elections of the
effective executive, takes a value of “1” if dictators are directly elected through multi-
candidate contests.17 It takes a value of “0” if they are not elected, selected by a
small and unelected body, or elected through single-candidate elections. My second
dependent variable, legislative elections, takes a value of “1” if the members of the
legislative body are directly chosen by contested elections. It takes a value of “0” if
no legislature exists, the members are not elected or appointed, or they are elected
13Classification is primarily based on Geddes et al. (2013). Boix et al. (2013) and Cheibub et al.
(2010) were used to supplement the measurement of the cases that Geddes et al. (2013) does not
cover.
14I used the version 3 (Release 5.1) that was updated in May 2013.
15This variable has five categories: Dictators are (1) unelected, (2) elected through one party or
candidate elections, (3) selected by a small, unelected body, (4) elected by less than 75% of the
vote, and (5) elected more than 75% of the vote. The last two categories include cases in which
dictators are indirectly elected by the group of people who are directly elected by popular votes.
16This variable has six categories: (1) No national legislature exists, (2) the members are not
elected or appointed, (3) they are elected through single-party or single-candidate elections, (4)
multiple parties compete and the largest party shares less than 75% of seats, (5) multiple parties
compete and the largest party shares more than 75% of seats, and (6) political parties are banned
and multiple candidates compete. National legislature refers to the lower chamber in the case of
bicameralism.
17It include cases in which dictators are not directly elected, but are premier with directly elected
legislative body.
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Table 2.3: Dictatorships, 1946–2008
Country Year Country Year Country Year
Afghanistan 1946–2000 Guatemala 1954–1994 Poland 1946–1988
Albania 1946–1990 Guinea 1958–2008 Portugal 1946–1975
Algeria 1962–2008 Guinea-Bissau 1974–1999 Qatar 1971–2008
Angola 1975–2008 2002–2004 Romania 1946–1989
Argentina 1951–1972 Guyana 1966–1991 Russia 1999–2008
1976–1982 Haiti 1950–1989 Rwanda 1962–2008
Armenia 1994–2008 1991–1993 Samoa 1962–2008
Azerbaijan 1991 1999–2005 Sao Tome and Principe 1976–1990
1993–2008 Honduras 1946–1956 Saudi Arabia 1946–2008
Bahrain 1971–2008 1963–1970 Senegal 1960–1999
Bangladesh 1971–1989 1972–1981 Seychelles 1976–2008
2007 Hungary 1947–1989 Sierra Leone 1967–1995
Belarus 1991–2008 Indonesia 1946–1998 1997
Benin 1960–1990 Iran 1946–2008 Singapore 1965–2008
Bhutan 1949–2008 Iraq 1946–2002 Solomon Islands 2000–2005
Bolivia 1946–1978 Ivory Coast 1960–2008 Somalia 1969–2008
1980–1981 Jordan 1946–2008 South Africa 1946–1993
Botswana 1966–2008 Kazakhstan 1991–2008 Soviet Union 1946–1990
Brazil 1964–1984 Kenya 1963–2001 Spain 1946–1976
Brunei 1985–2008 Korea, North 1948–2008 Sri Lanka 1978–1993
Bulgaria 1946–1989 Korea, South 1948–1959 Sudan 1958–1964
Burkina Faso 1960–2008 1961–1986 1969–1985
Burundi 1962–1992 Kuwait 1961–2008 1989–2008
1996–2004 Kyrgyzstan 1991–2008 Suriname 1980–1987
Cambodia 1953–2008 Laos 1959–2008 1990
Cameroon 1960–2008 Lebanon 1976–2004 Swaziland 1968–2008
Cape Verde 1975–1990 Lesotho 1970–1992 Syria 1946
Central African Republic 1960–1992 Liberia 1946–2004 1949–1953
2003–2008 Libya 1951–2008 1957–1960
Chad 1960–2008 Madagascar 1960–1992 1962–2008
Chile 1973–1988 Malawi 1964–1993 Taiwan 1949–1999
China 1946–2008 Malaysia 1957–2008 Tajikistan 1991–2008
Colombia 1949–1957 Maldives 1966–2008 Tanzania 1964–2008
Comoros 1975–2005 Mali 1960–1991 Thailand 1946–1974
Congo 1960–1991 Mauritania 1946–2006 1976–1987
1997–2008 2008 1991
Congo, Democratic Republic 1960–2008 Mexico 1946–1999 2006
Costa Rica 1948 Mongolia 1946–1992 Togo 1960–1962
Croatia 1991–1999 Morocco 1956–2008 1967–2008
Cuba 1952–2008 Mozambique 1975–2008 Tonga 1970–2008
Cyprus 1960–1976 Myanmar 1958–1959 Tunisia 1956–2008
Czechoslovakia 1948–1988 1962–2008 Turkey 1946–1949
Djibouti 1977–2008 Namibia 1990–2008 1957–1960
Dominican Republic 1946–1961 Nepal 1946–1990 1980–1982
1963–1977 2002–2005 Turkmenistan 1991–2008
Ecuador 1946–1947 Nicaragua 1946–1989 Uganda 1966–2008
1963–1967 Niger 1960–1992 United Arab Emirates 1971–2008
1970–1978 1996–1998 Uruguay 1973–1983
Egypt 1946–2008 Nigeria 1966–1978 Uzbekistan 1991–2008
El Salvador 1946–1993 1983–1998 Venezuela 1948–1957
Equatorial Guinea 1968–2008 Oman 1946–2008 2005–2008
Eritrea 1993–2008 Pakistan 1947–1971 Vietnam 1976–2008
Ethiopia 1946–2008 1975–1987 Vietnam, North 1954–1975
Fiji 1987–2008 1999–2007 Vietnam, South 1955–1974
Gabon 1960–2008 Panama 1949–1951 Yemen 1990–2008
Gambia 1965–2008 1953–1954 Yemen, North 1946–1989
Georgia 1991–2003 1968–1988 Yemen, South 1967–1989
Germany, East 1949–1989 Paraguay 1946–1992 Yugoslavia 1946–1991
Ghana 1960–1968 Peru 1948–1955 Yugoslavia 1992–1999
1972–1978 1962 (Serbia and Montenegro)
1981–1999 1968–1979 Zambia 1967–1990
Greece 1967–1973 1992–2000 1996–2008
Grenada 1979–1983 Philippines 1972–1985 Zimbabwe 1965–2008
through single-party or single-candidate elections. With this operationalization a
dictatorship has a stream of values of “0” or “1” for both types of elections. Since
I test the hypotheses about the decision of holding elections, once dictators start
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holding elections, their regimes are dropped from the sample in subsequent years.18
Thus, for instance, countries where multi-candidate elections of the effective executive
have never been held (e.g., China) show a series of “0” in elections of the effective
executive. In contrast, this variable is coded as “0” from 1946 to 2004 in Egypt since
no multi-candidate elections of dictators were held. But, the variable takes a value of
“1” in 2005 when the presidency became subject to contested elections. From 2006
to 2008, the country is dropped from the sample since no change was made for the
mode of the leadership selection.19
The first key independent variable is a dichotomous indicator for dynastic monar-
chy. Following the aforementioned definition by Herb (1999) and the data provided
by Cheibub et al. (2010), this variable is coded as “1” if a dictatorship was an
established dynastic monarchy, and it takes “0” otherwise.
The second key independent variable is a measure for single-party regime, which
represents the restrictions on political parties.20 I used data collected by Cheibub
et al. (2010). In this data set, a variable called dejure measures different levels
of legal restriction on parties, while defacto and defacto2 refer to actual, de facto
18In fact, previous studies do not follow my approach and keep dictatorships that continue to hold
elections in the sample (e.g., Cox 2009). Their approach is valid insofar as the following assumption
holds: The factors that let dictators hold elections also affect their decision of quitting elections. In
my view, to begin elections and to stop them are two distinct classes of phenomena, and therefore
I solely focus on the former.
19These are the examples of coding on the basis of regime-year observations. As I detail be-
low, however, alternatives are to measure the dependent variables with respect to leader-year and
authoritarian-spell-year.
20Some might think of subtypes of nondemocracies such as single-party regime, personalist regime,
and military regime that are developed by Geddes (2003). A problem with this type of measure
is that those subtypes do not necessarily correspond with the presence/lack of regime-sanctioned
parties. As Svolik (2012, 29) contends, those subtypes are proposed by reducing multiple dimensions
of nondemocratic rule into a single dimension. For example, military regimes emphasize the level of
military intervention into politics whereas single-party regimes stresses the restriction on political
parties. The use of those subtypes is justified only if one theorizes important distinction between
them. In the present analysis, what matters is simply the presence of regime-sanctioned parties, and
therefore I need to observe the varying level of restriction on political parties across nondemocracies,
not the difference between composite measure of regime types.
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existence of political parties. dejure has three categories: (1) All parties are legally
banned, (2) one party is legalized, and (3) multiple parties are legally allowed. One
problem with observing de jure restrictions is that it does not necessarily reflect the
actual presence of regime sanctioned parties. In some cases, trivial participation of
minor parties is allowed (e.g., Singapore) or satellite parties are intentionally created
in order to disguise multipartism (e.g., Poland under communist rule). Because of
this problem, I used an indicator that counts de facto number of political parties as
a measure of actual working of political parties. For the present analyses, I relied on
a variable called defacto2 that has three categories: (1) no party, (2) one party, or
(3) multiple parties.21 I created a dummy variable for each category and used the
variable for multiple parties as a reference category.
The third key independent variable measures dictators’ military capacity. One
way to assess it might be to compare military regimes with non-military regimes,
typically civilian dictatorships (Debs 2010; Geddes et al. 2013). However, the mere
facts that dictators are not professional soldiers or that the military does not inter-
vene into politics at all do not necessarily mean that a particular dictator is militarily
weak. Indeed, as Svolik (2012, 134) argues, the extent to which the military inter-
venes into politics depends on the proclivity of mass threats and the indispensability
of the military as a coercive force to suppress those threats. This implies that civil-
ian dictators can be heterogeneous in their military capacity. Therefore, rather than
comparing military dictatorships with civilian dictatorships, I focus on the differences
21I chose defacto2 over defacto for the following reason. defacto counts the number of existing
political parties. Therefore, it considers that multiple parties de facto exist in countries such
as China where multiple parties are legalized and parties other than the Communist Party of
China indeed exist although those minor parties are mere satellite parties and are subordinate to
the regime. defacto2 does not count those parties and consider China as de facto single-party
dictatorship. Note that I report in appendices the results that are obtained from these alternative
measures of restrictions on political parties (dejure and defacto) in order to show that my findings
are not sensitive to the choice of particular measures.
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between military dictators. One possible indicator that represents this variation is
the extent to which the preferences of dictators and the military align with each
other. I relied on a measure that was developed by Svolik (2012, 33) to capture this.
When dictators are professional solders, there are two distinct types. On the one
hand, the military rule is corporate if the military is institutionally incorporated
into government’s decision-making, which is typically the case where a dictator rules
as a part of the military junta. On the other hand, the military rule is personal
if a single or a few military personnel happen to seize power and the military as an
organization does not prevail together with the dictator in the regime. To be com-
prehensive, dictatorships in which the military rule is neither corporate nor personal
are the regimes with civilian dictators. I thus refine the third hypothesis that I
suggested above:
H3a: Dictatorships with corporate military rule are more likely to hold elections of
the effective executive.
Five control variables reflect factors that may affect the decision of holding elec-
tions of the effective executive as well as legislative elections. First, I controlled for
how dictators (their allies) came in office before transition to multi-candidate/party
elections happened. As I described above, dictators (their allies) come to power
through non-electoral means or single-candidate elections. In order to reflect this
variation, I constructed a dummy variable that takes a value of “1” if dictators
(their allies) were selected by single-candidate (party) elections. It is coded as “0”
otherwise. Second, the presence of a legislature might play a similar role to polit-
ical parties in facilitating policy concessions between a dictator and elites (Gandhi
2008, 79–80). Following this logic, one possible expectation is that the existence of a
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national legislature decreases the probability of holding elections.22 I used Cheibub
(2008)’s data and created a dummy variable legislature that takes a value of “1” if
the legislature exists, and “0” otherwise.23 Third, ethnic-linguistic fractionalization
is a continuous variable (Alesina et al. 2003) and was used as a proxy of policy
polarization.24 Greater diversity corresponds to a higher cost of policy concessions
(Gandhi 2008, 87),25 which might decrease the incentive to hold elections in general.
Fourth, the proportion of democracies in the world is a continuous variable and can
be thought as a proxy for external factors that affect the demand for political liberal-
ization and democratization. A higher proportion of democracies might empower the
opposition and increase domestic pressure for reform (Gandhi 2008, 96–97), which
then gives dictators an incentive to hold contested elections. Lastly, I included a
dummy variable for the Cold War. It is coded as “1” from 1945 to 1990 and “0”
after 1991. This variable was employed to account for any potential impact of the
Cold War on the incentives for holding multiparty elections.
Two variables take into account economic conditions. First, the level of economic
development is measured by the natural log of GDP per capita. Economic growth
represents annual change in GDP per capita. These data were obtained from Bolt
and van Zanden (2013), which is the update of Maddison (2008).26
22There are views, however, that the role of legislature is limited (Blaydes 2011) or conditional
upon subtypes of dictatorships (Wright 2008). Since thorough analyses of the legislature is beyond
the scope of this Chapter, I simply control for the existence of national legislature in my analyses.
23More specifically, I used a variable named closed that has three categories: Legislature is (1)
closed, (2) appointed, and (3) elected. If the legislature is either appointed or elected, legislature
is coded as “1.” It takes a value of “0” if legislature is closed. In bicameral system, the legislature
refers to the lower house.
24Another possible proxy for policy polarization is economic inequality. I collected measures on
Gini coefficient (Solt 2009; UTIP-UNIDO 2008), but they were not used because the large number
of missing observations significantly reduced the sample size.
25One possible criticism to this view is that that the mechanism is not that ethnic cleavages cause
conflicts in preferences, but that those conflicts at the local level happen to coincide with ethnicity
(Przeworski 2009, 6–7).
26Another economic factor that has been studied in the literature and might affect the outcome
of the interest is the national economy’s dependence on natural resources (Dunning 2008; Ross
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Finally, time dependence is an issue that requires careful treatment. Following
Carter and Signorino (2010), I included in logistic regressions a cubic polynomial of
the duration for which multiparty/candidate elections were not held. This duration
can, however, be counted in a number of ways. A usual practice in the literature is to
measure the duration of the non-electoral period if a country was a dictatorship. This
approach, however, is increasingly criticized because it ignores leadership changes in
dictatorships (Przeworski 2007). At the same time, using the length of leader tenures
as the duration is deemed problematic for dictatorships in which leaders change but
the same political coalition sustains (Svolik 2012, 185). For those reasons, I followed
the approach that Svolik (2012, 41–43) suggested27 and counted the non-electoral
years of dictatorships by each ruling coalition.28 This means that the unit of analyses
is not country-year or leader-year, but ruling-coalition-year.29
2.5 Findings/Results
I estimated logistic regressions with a cubic polynomial of the duration of the
non-electoral periods. All independent variables were lagged by one year. The first
column of Table 2.4 shows the model in which the ruling coalition is the unit of
analysis. The results show that, consistent with my theoretical expectations, dynastic
monarchies are less likely to hold elections for the effective executive (H1). Single-
party regimes are less likely to hold contested elections of the effective executive than
2001). I have collected data on fuel exports and ore and metal exports from World Bank (2013)
and computed their share in total merchandise exports. The data cover 1960 to 2012.
27Svolik (2012, 42) defines that a dictator “was politically affiliated with the previous leader and,
hence, from the same ruling coalition if he was a member of the government, a government party,
the royal or ruling family, or a military junta under the previous authoritarian leader.”
28Since the data that I collected lack information prior to 1946, no information was available in
order to left-censor the duration variable. That is, the duration variable begins with 0 in 1946 if
an observation appears in the sample. Data collection for the period before 1945 is the agenda of
future research.
29In order to see whether my findings are sensitive to those different units of analyses, I report
estimation results based on country-year and leader-year observations.
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regimes where multiple parties de facto exist (H2). As expected, dictatorships with
corporate military rule are more likely to hold this type of election than regimes
with personal military rule (H3a). The type of previous leadership selection is found
to have no statistically significant effect on the decision of holding multi-candidate
elections of the effective executive. That is, dictators who hold onto power with
force and those who are “elected” by plebiscite or referendum (with no alternative
candidate) are not different from each other with regard to their propensity to hold
this type of election. The results also suggest that greater economic growth decreases
the probability of holding the elections while a higher proportion of democracies in
the world is positively associated with it. In contrast to that, the level of economic
development, the existence of a national legislature, the level of ethnic-linguistic
fractionalization, and the period of cold war are not systematically related to the
likelihood of holding elections of the effective executive.
In the fourth column of Table 2.4, I present an analogous model with Column
1, but the dependent variable is legislative elections. The same set of independent
variables was included in the model in order to highlight that we need to make a
distinction between these types of elections. The findings are consistent with my
expectation and single-party regimes are less likely to hold legislative elections than
de facto multiparty regimes (H4). As expected, but showing a clear contrast to the
model of elections of dictators, the results demonstrate that dynastic monarchies
and dictators’ military capacity are not related to the decision of holding contested
legislative elections. Another difference from Column 1 is that the type of allies
selection matters. Compared to regimes where the regime allies are appointed or
unelected, dictatorships where single-party or single-candidate legislative elections
are held are less likely to opt for multiparty legislative elections.
In Table 2.4, I also present the findings based on alternative units of analyses.
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Table 2.4: Causes of Elections in Nondemocracies, 1946–2008
Types of Elections
Effective Executive Legislative
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Leadership Succession1
Dynastic Monarchy -2.993∗∗ -2.941∗∗ (dropped) -0.602 -0.710 -0.880
(1.328) (1.264) (0.772) (0.755) (0.883)
Political Party (de facto)2
Single-Party Regime -3.172∗∗∗ -2.949∗∗∗ -3.129∗∗∗ -1.907∗∗∗ -1.764∗∗∗ -1.775∗∗∗
(0.556) (0.501) (0.590) (0.473) (0.443) (0.451)
Parties Banned -1.895∗∗ -1.563∗∗ -1.753∗∗ -2.254∗∗∗ -1.898∗∗∗ -1.938∗∗∗
(0.812) (0.669) (0.794) (0.871) (0.705) (0.717)
Military Involvement into Politics3
Corporate 1.204∗∗ 0.964∗ 0.466 0.263 0.278 0.109
(0.581) (0.501) (0.554) (0.541) (0.406) (0.459)
Civilian 0.880∗∗ 0.657∗∗ 0.420 0.199 0.112 0.062
(0.375) (0.310) (0.364) (0.383) (0.361) (0.389)
Economic Development -0.006 0.029 -0.287 -0.207 -0.179 -0.244
(0.255) (0.237) (0.270) (0.187) (0.190) (0.204)
Growth -5.135∗∗∗ -3.787∗∗ -4.143∗∗∗ -3.738∗∗∗ -3.290∗∗∗ -3.918∗∗∗
(1.860) (1.474) (1.464) (1.401) (1.164) (1.289)
Controls
Single-Candidate 0.169 0.290 0.094
Executive Elections4 (0.389) (0.363) (0.378)
Single-Party -0.769∗∗ -0.809∗∗ -0.878∗∗
Legislative Elections5 (0.349) (0.325) (0.371)
Legislature6 0.648 0.445 0.637 0.486 0.601∗ 0.568
(0.549) (0.476) (0.519) (0.376) (0.353) (0.392)
Proportion of Democracies 8.336∗∗∗ 7.573∗∗ 3.267 3.899 3.489 3.117
(3.113) (2.946) (2.954) (2.543) (2.409) (2.541)
Ethnic-Linguistic 0.477 0.485 0.208 -0.011 -0.124 -0.300
Fractionalization (0.663) (0.610) (0.631) (0.708) (0.672) (0.628)
Cold War 0.038 0.022 -0.531 0.088 -0.045 -0.232
(0.563) (0.551) (0.614) (0.620) (0.564) (0.597)
Constant -2.698 -3.523 1.354 1.344 1.336 2.023
(3.259) (3.246) (2.931) (2.298) (2.365) (2.178)
N 2814 2903 2365 2529 2619 2605
N of clusters 137 106 287 132 107 299
Clustered by ruling country leader ruling country leader
coalition coalition
Wald χ2 169.97 177.65 93.35 112.39 159.64 113.81
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log pseudolikelihood -194.042 -219.924 -185.238 -244.361 -266.360 -228.021
Pseudo R2 0.273 0.247 0.223 0.132 0.183 0.169
Logistic regression. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 (Two-tailed test).
Parameter estimates and standard errors for duration dependence are not shown, but available upon request.
1 Reference category is “No dynastic monarchy.” 2 Reference category is “Multiple parties.”
3 Reference category is “Personal.” 4Reference category is “Unelected or Appointed Dictators.”
5 Reference category is “Unelected or Appointed Regime Allies.” 6 Reference category is “No Legislature.”
Setting the elections of the effective executive as the dependent variable, Column 2
shows the results from regime-year observations while Column 3 is estimated with
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leader-year observations. The findings are substantively unchanged by moving from
Column 1 to Column 2. In contrast to that, Column 3 shows no estimated coefficient
on dynastic monarchy. This happened because, based on leader-year observations,
no dictators in dynastic monarchies held elections of the effective executive, which is
in fact consistent with my theoretical expectation. Another deviation from Column
1 and Column 2 to Column 3 is that the coefficient on corporate military is positive,
but not statistically significant. One interpretation of this result is that, because the
duration of individual leaders’ tenure represents their idiosyncratic strength including
their military capacity,30 leader-year observations are not pertinent to assess the
impact of the measure of dictators’ military capacity.31 As for models that set the
contested legislative elections as the dependent variable (Column 5 and Column 6,
Table 2.4), the findings are substantively the same across different units of analyses.
In order to illustrate the core findings, Table 2.5 presents the extent to which
the predicted probability of holding contested elections changes with respect to the
hypothesized factors.32 Institutionalizing leadership succession by establishing either
a dynastic monarchy or a regime-sanctioned party decreases the probability of hold-
ing elections of the effective executive by 7%. Dictators who rule as a part of the
military junta are more likely to hold elections of the effective executive by 15% in
order to prevent violent removal than those who do not incorporate the military as
an organization into dictatorial rule. Finally, dictatorships in which multiple parties
de facto exist are more likely to opt for contested legislative elections by 4 % that
regimes that establish a regime-sanctioned party.
30See Svolik (2012, 185) for the similar discussion.
31The result is not driven by exclusion of dynastic monarchies from the sample. When I estimated
Model 1 that dropped all dynastic monarchies from the sample, I still obtained the substantively
same inference as Column 1 provides (Results not shown, but available upon request).
32Table 3.8 is based on simulations using Clarify (Tomz et al. 2001). The models used to compute
the predicted probability are those in Column 1 and Column 4 of Table 2.4 with the value of all
covariates set to their median.
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Table 2.5: Changes in the Predicted Probability
Probability of
Holding Elections
Elections of the Effective Executive
H1: Dynastic Monarchy –7%
(vs. Other Dictatorships) [–16, –1]
H2: Single-Party Regime –7%
(vs. Multiparty Regime) [–15, –3]
H3: Corporate Military Rule +15%
(vs. Personal Military Rule) [1, 40]
Legislative Elections
H4: Single-Party Regime –4%
(vs. Multiparty Regime) [–8, –1]
Note: The 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
In order to ascertain that the findings are not driven from a particular measure of
the restriction on political parties, I ran a set of analyses that employs the measure
of legal restriction (i.e., dejure variable in Cheibub et al. (2010)). Table 2.6 shows
the estimation results. Conclusions obtained from this alternative measure remain
unchanged.
2.6 Implications and Conclusions
In this Chapter, I have developed and found empirical support for a theory about
the causes of contested elections in nondemocratic settings. Studies have been accu-
mulated that explore the role of elections with respect to dictators’ political survival,
but they yield both the regime-sustaining role and the regime-subverting role, lead-
ing to unclear and equivocal explanations of the causes of those elections. In order to
better understand when and why dictators decide to hold elections, I argue that the
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Table 2.6: Robustness Check (De jure restrictions on political parties)
Types of Elections
Effective Executive Legislative
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Leadership Succession1
Dynastic Monarchy -2.461∗ -2.443∗∗ (dropped) -0.458 -0.471 -0.727
(1.290) (1.237) (0.666) (0.632) (0.772)
Political Party (de jure)2
Single-Party Regime -3.458∗∗∗ -3.621∗∗∗ -3.413∗∗∗ -1.560∗∗∗ -1.660∗∗∗ -1.705∗∗∗
(0.988) (0.994) (0.963) (0.436) (0.439) (0.481)
Parties Banned -1.081∗ -1.125∗∗ -0.943 -1.999∗∗∗ -1.842∗∗∗ -1.862∗∗∗
(0.580) (0.531) (0.604) (0.676) (0.569) (0.602)
Military Involvement into Politics3
Corporate 1.338∗∗ 1.117∗∗ 0.586 0.484 0.485 0.243
(0.613) (0.536) (0.584) (0.544) (0.404) (0.483)
Civilian 0.588 0.427 0.201 0.343 0.226 0.194
(0.378) (0.331) (0.384) (0.417) (0.390) (0.419)
Economic Development 0.009 0.017 -0.288 -0.202 -0.201 -0.296
(0.248) (0.228) (0.245) (0.185) (0.190) (0.197)
Growth -4.641∗∗∗ -3.610∗∗∗ -3.125∗∗ -3.299∗∗ -2.870∗∗ -3.483∗∗∗
(1.646) (1.393) (1.476) (1.370) (1.160) (1.269)
Controls
Single-Candidate -0.188 -0.076 -0.248
Executive Elections4 (0.413) (0.396) (0.385)
Single-Party -1.470∗∗∗ -1.392∗∗∗ -1.568∗∗∗
Legislative Elections5 (0.319) (0.291) (0.361)
Legislature6 0.721 0.446 0.638 0.589 0.592∗ 0.567
(0.560) (0.497) (0.576) (0.381) (0.357) (0.394)
Proportion of Democracies 7.563∗∗ 7.151∗∗ 2.796 4.795∗ 4.607∗ 3.825
(3.084) (2.935) (3.072) (2.634) (2.471) (2.608)
Ethnic-Linguistic 1.454∗ 1.389∗ 1.086 0.526 0.363 0.408
Fractionalization (0.788) (0.728) (0.707) (0.835) (0.768) (0.735)
Cold War -0.203 -0.158 -0.784 0.016 0.001 -0.139
(0.637) (0.607) (0.661) (0.616) (0.563) (0.608)
Constant -3.292 -3.730 0.169 0.149 0.276 1.213
(2.941) (2.963) (2.851) (2.422) (2.473) (2.266)
N 2814 2903 2365 2529 2619 2605
N of clusters 137 106 287 132 107 299
Clustered by ruling country leader ruling country leader
coalition coalition
Wald χ2 111.30 123.97 62.75 127.48 175.20 103.86
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log pseudolikelihood -207.628 -229.539 -198.064 -249.991 -269.073 -230.665
Pseudo R2 0.222 0.214 0.169 0.163 0.175 0.159
Logistic regression. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 (Two-tailed test).
Parameter estimates and standard errors for duration dependence are not shown, but available upon request.
1 Reference category is “No dynastic monarchy.” 2 Reference category is “Multiple parties.”
3 Reference category is “Personal.” 4Reference category is “Unelected or Appointed Dictators.”
5 Reference category is “Unelected or Appointed Regime Allies.” 6 Reference category is “No Legislature.”
distinction should be made between the types of elections since the different types
coincide with those who get elected. On the one hand, elections of the effective ex-
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ecutive are intended to prevent violent ouster of dictators, and thereby can work as
an institutionalized means of leadership succession. On the other hand, legislative
elections select regime allies and are primarily aimed at co-optation and elite unity.
Unless we separate the different types of elections and scrutinize the different moti-
vations behind them, we can not develop an accurate understanding of the causes of
elections in nondemocratic settings.
Most studies on nondemocratic elections have focused on the role of elections and
the discussion has been made usually in isolation from the role of other political in-
stitutions such as political parties and legislatures that dictators can make use of. At
the same time, scholars who investigate the causes and the consequences of political
parties and legislature in nondemocracies have been aware of elections as another
important type of institutional arrangement, but thorough analyses of elections are
set aside as a future agenda (Gandhi 2008, xx; Svolik 2012, 91). In this regard, my
theory of the causes of nondemocratic elections can bridge two separate bodies of the
literature as it incorporates institutional alternatives into the motivation of holding
those elections. Of course, more studies are needed to disentangle the relationship
among elections, parties, legislature, and other form of political institutions available
in nondemocracies.
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3. CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTIONS IN NONDEMOCRACIES
3.1 Introduction
Elections constitute a key element of democracies as they make incumbent gov-
ernments and politicians accountable for their policy-making and enable peaceful
alternation in power. However, it is also known that holding elections is not a suf-
ficient condition for a nation to be considered a full-fledged democracy. Intuitively
enough, elections without competition—which we saw in the Soviet Union and that
we can observe even today in North Korea, for instance—should have no relevance
to democratic political regimes. What is puzzling is that electoral competition ap-
pears to exist in some dictatorships albeit a limited degree and those “competitive”
elections become more frequently held in the last two decades (Magaloni 2008, 734;
Ottaway 2003; Roessler and Howard 2009; Schedler 2013, 25). One body of previous
research suggests that those elections are inherently destabilizing for dictatorships
and they might even cause democratic transitions (Huntington 1991; O’Donnell and
Schmitter 1986). Another body of the literature, however, claims that they in effect
prolong the life of dictatorships (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). In this Chapter, I will
neither make these two views compete with each other nor suggest that one is supe-
rior to another. Instead, I attempt to argue that these seemingly competing views
are mutually complementary since they look at different parts of causal processes
that are associated with elections in nondemocratic settings.
On theoretical grounds, those who claim the regime-sustaining role of elections
emphasize the possible benefits that elections produce with respect to regime survival.
As I discussed in the previous Chapter, elections can play an information generating
role as well as a constraining role (Schedler 2013, 144–145). These possible fruits of
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elections shape and characterize important elements of authoritarian politics before
and after elections: cooptation policies, elites’ perception about the regime’s invin-
cibility and their decision to cooperate/defect from the regime, and power-sharing
between dictators and their allies (Brownlee 2007, 3; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009;
Magaloni 2008, 728). In contrast to these possible benefits, those who argue about
the regime-destabilizing role and the democratizing role of elections are primarily
interested in whether elections per se have causal leverage on regime change and
democratization (Brownlee 2009; Donno 2013; Howard and Roessler 2006; Lindberg
2009; Teorell and Hadenius 2009). In other words, the central focus is placed on the
way in which elections create a momentum and bring changes. Among others, one
plausible mechanism that has been suggested in the literature is that elections that
allow competition might work as a focal point, facilitate opposition coordination,
and lead to regime turbulence or democratic transitions (Beissinger 2007; Bunce and
Wolchik 2009). In sum, two interrelated, but different dynamics can be at work
with respect to elections in nondemocratic settings, but they are not necessarily
contradictory of one another.
Empirical evidence for these two views is even more perplexing since the research
design as well as the measurement of relevant variables in previous research has
been brought into question. First, some of the most influential studies on the power
of elections have tried to identify which elections are likely to result in democratic
changes (Donno 2013; Howard and Roessler 2006). Certainly, they identified factors
that might give elections a democratizing role. However, it does not necessarily
mean that those studies were able to show that elections per se have causal forces
(Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 416). By design, the power of elections is best assessed
when a researcher compares cases in which elections are held with otherwise identical
cases without elections. However, Donno (2013) and Howard and Roessler (2006),
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for instance, compared elections in nondemocratic settings, and consequently the
impact of elections themselves remains unclear. Second, past empirical research had
to rely on an indirect and unreliable measure of electoral competition due to the lack
of data (Brownlee 2009; Howard and Roessler 2006). However, with a recent data
collection effort (Hyde and Marinov 2012), researchers today are able to separate
the possibility of electoral competition from actual competitiveness of elections in
dictatorships, which in turn contributes to more plausible hypothesis testing.
In the sections that follow, I begin with a brief review of the literature on the con-
sequences of elections in nondemocratic settings. I then offer a theory that explains
how ex ante electoral competition and ex post competitiveness of elections affect the
survival of dictatorships as well as the chances of democratic transitions. In the
third section, I summarize the data set that I created to test my theory. Fourth, I
present findings from my empirical analyses of the consequences of elections. The
last section concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Since the end of the cold war, a growing number of dictatorships have held elec-
tions while resisting democratization. Although these regimes were not completely
new in a historical perspective (Diamond 2002; Przeworski 2009; Schedler 2006), the
spike in the number of election-holding dictatorships urged scholars to understand
them. Earlier studies described them as a distinct type of dictatorships and labeled
those regimes, for example, as electoral authoritarianism, competitive authoritari-
anism, hybrid regimes, or partial democracies (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Diamond
2002; Levitsky and Way 2002; McFaul 2002; Schedler 2002). As Figure 3.1 shows,
the number of years in which dictatorships held elections1 has been relatively sta-
1Here, elections include elections for Constituent Assembly, executive elections, and legislative
elections. For each dictatorship, I counted whether or not at least one of the three types of elections
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ble over time after WWII, implying that the use of elections by dictatorships is not
a completely new phenomenon. At the same time, as is shown in Figure 3.2, the
proportion of dictatorships that held elections declined in 1960s and increased after
late 1980s. And this is the fact that motivated recent scholarship on elections in
nondemocratic settings.
The logical next step in this line of inquiry is to explain whether elections in
nondemocratic settings help the regime survival or cause democratization. On the
one hand, some argue that elections play a regime-sustaining role (Chehabi and
Linz 1998, 18). For instance, elections can help the regime to collect information
about regime support and opposition, and that information can then be used to
shape effective redistribution policies (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Lust-Okar 2008).
Overwhelming electoral victory signals the invincibility of dictatorships, which in
turn deters challenges from opposition forces (Brownlee 2007; Schedler 2006, 14;
Simpser 2013). On the other hand, however, there are views that elections are
inherently destabilizing for dictatorships (Huntington 1991, 174–175; O’Donnell and
Schmitter 1986, 15). Elections can work as a focal point in which elites split and
defect from the ruling circle (Langston 2006; van de Walle 2006) and opposition forces
coalesce and challenge the regime (Bunce and Wolchik 2009; Howard and Roessler
2006; Tucker 2007), leading to liberalization of the political sphere (Howard and
Roessler 2006) or democratic transitions (Brownlee 2009; Donno 2013).
Empirical evidence of the regime-sustaining role of elections has primarily been
found in a set of case studies on Egypt (Blaydes 2011), Jordan (Lust-Okar 2006),
Mexico (Magaloni 2006), and Vietnam (Malesky and Schuler 2011). Brownlee (2009)
conducted a cross-national test and compared competitive electoral regimes, hege-
were held in a given year. Elections in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 include elections with ex ante
competition and those without ex ante competition that I discuss in a greater detail later.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Election-Year in Dictatorships, 1946–2010
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monic electoral regimes, and closed regimes (in which no elections are held). He
found a negative, but statistically insignificant effect of competitive regimes on regime
breakdown relative to closed regimes. That is, more evidence is required in order
to avoid overgeneralization of the theoretical claims (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009,
406). With respect to the regime-destabilizing and democratizing role of elections,
Howard and Roessler’s (2006) cross-national research sampled elections in compet-
itive regimes and found that elections result in liberalization if opposition parties
form pre-electoral coalitions. Donno (2013) sampled elections in both competitive
and hegemonic regimes and found that the effect of opposition coalitions on democ-
ratization is most salient in elections in competitive regimes. Although these studies
on democratization through elections shed new light on the dynamics of elections,
they only include election-years in the sample, raising a question about the causality
of elections. That is, it remains unclear whether elections themselves influence the
proclivity of change or some unobserved factors that enable opposition coalition, for
instance, give elections a democratizing effect.
On the surface, these views appear competing and mutually exclusive. Empirical
evidence is mixed and inconclusive. However, as I discuss below, they are comple-
mentary elements of these two bodies of the literature because they look at different
aspects of elections in nondemocratic settings. The key, I argue, is to distinguish
between ex post competitiveness of elections and ex ante existence of electoral com-
petition. This forms a crucial building-block of my theoretical explanations.
3.3 Theory
In brief, ex post competitiveness of elections refers to the extent to which the
ruling circle prevails, which is usually observed by election outcomes including the
vote share and the seat share of the ruling party or group. It shapes and conditions
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the political arena in which the ruling elites and opposition camps operate between
elections. In contrast, the ex ante existence of electoral competition affects whether
or not individual elections become the moment of regime change, and thereby directly
cause democratic transitions. Unlike ex post competitiveness, ex ante competition
is defined and observed separately from election outcomes (Hyde and Marinov 2012,
202) and indicates whether or not competition is allowed in a given election.
According to Hyde and Marinov (2012, 194), an election is deemed allowing
competition ex ante if the following three conditions are met: (1) if at least one
opposition2 exists to contest the election, (2) if multiple political parties are legal3,
and (3) if there is a choice of candidates on the ballot. The three conditions con-
stitute what they describe as “minimalist definition of electoral competition” (192).
Elections without ex ante competition have virtually no potential to bring change.
Instead, such elections determine who can be inside or outside of the regime, and
easily become contests for resources and favors (Lust-Okar 2009; Wintrobe 1998), a
co-optation game (Lindberg 2009), or the moment for replacing “older cadres with
younger, more loyal ones” (CBC News 2014). The majority of this type of elec-
tion is found in communist regimes, Africa, and the Middle East. Elections with ex
ante competition, in turn, could be lost, although the outcome depends on how the
elections are contested. Figure 3.3 depicts the evolution of these two types of elec-
tions over time. Elections without ex ante competition had outnumbered those with
the minimum level of competition during the time of the cold war. And the latter
has increased since the beginning of the third wave of democratization (Huntington
1991) in mid 1970s and became more widespread after the late 1980s while there still
2“An opposition party or group is one that is not in the government and is not affiliated with
the party in power” (Hyde and Marinov 2012, 197).
3This condition requires “that a party exists, is legal, and that the nongovernment party is an
independent political entity” (Hyde and Marinov 2012, 197).
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Figure 3.3: Elections and ex ante Competition in Dictatorships, 1946–2010
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remain elections that do not allow ex ante competition today.
The above discussion implies that when examining the regime-destabilizing and
democratizing role of elections, a researcher needs to directly measure elections with
ex ante competition and examine their effect. Since elections without ex ante com-
petition are not, by definition, being lost, they should presumably cause no change.
If elections work as a focal point that induces change, we obtain the following set of
expectations:
H1: Elections that allow ex ante competition destabilize dictatorships and are likely
to cause regime breakdown.
H2: Elections that allow ex ante competition not only lead to the fall of dictator-
ships, but also increase the chances of democratic transitions.
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It is important to note that, in the previous research, scholars attempted to iden-
tify which elections can be lost and which can be a source of changes. This effort
is found in the scholarly discussion and conceptualization of competitive authori-
tarianism and hegemonic authoritarianism.4 On conceptual grounds, what makes a
dictatorship competitive a authoritarianism hinges on the presence of an opposition
and competition in regular elections (Diamond 2002, 29; Howard and Roessler 2006,
376) even if they are unfair and fraudulent (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52). Therefore,
elections that are held in this particular type of regimes are hypothesized to be a
cause of political liberalization (Howard and Roessler 2006) and democratic tran-
sitions (Brownlee 2009). In contrast, hegemonic authoritarianism is characterized
by the dominance of the ruling group (Diamond 2002, 29, 32), no effective electoral
competition (Howard and Roessler 2006, 367), and no possibility of losing (Roessler
and Howard 2009, 108).5 Clearly, one of the defining features of hegemonic author-
itarianism is the absence of ex ante competition. Hence, elections in this type of
dictatorship are not supposed to cause any changes. However, the measurement of
these two types of regimes was done not by observing each election and making
decisions about the existence of electoral competition, but by observing ex post com-
petitiveness and making an inference about which elections would allow competition.6
The obvious shortcoming of the latter strategy is that we can treat dictatorships as
hegemonic authoritarian simply because the margin of the incumbent victory was
sufficiently high. Yet, in order to be consistent with the concept, we need to measure
the presence and the absence of ex ante electoral competition.
4Table 3.1 lists the representative definitions of these regimes.
5Note that Roessler and Howard (2009) raises this point by citing Munck (2006, 33). Yet, for
Munck this criterion is proposed to differentiate democracies from nondemocracies.
6Howard and Roessler (2006, 368) describe these two strategies as “I know it when I see it”
formula versus “let the chips fall where they may” formula while acknowledging the possibility of
measurement errors that the latter approach might cause.
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Table 3.1: Definitions of the Subtypes of Dictatorships
Competitive Authoritarianism
Diamond (2002, 29): “One defining feature of competitive authoritarian regimes is significant
parliamentary opposition.”
Levitsky and Way (2002, 52): “In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic
institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political au-
thority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime
fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy.”
Howard and Roessler (2006, 367): “In competitive authoritarian systems, on the other
hand, regular, competitive elections are held between the ruling party and a legal and legitimate
opposition, which usually chooses to participate, rather than to boycott. But the incumbent
regime still uses fraud, repression, and other illiberal means “to create an uneven playing field
between government and opposition” (Levitsky and Way 2002, 53) to try to ensure that it
ultimately prevails in the electoral contest.”
Roessler and Howard (2009, 108): “Competitive authoritarian systems, on the other hand,
permit a substantively higher degree of contestation, leading to greater uncertainty in the
outcome of the elections between the ruling party and a legal and legitimate opposition, which
usually chooses to participate, rather than to boycott the election.”
Hegemonic Authoritarianism
Diamond (2002, 29, 32): “In regimes where elections are largely an authoritarian fac¸ade,
the ruling or dominant party wins almost all the seats... One clear sign of hegemony is when
the president “wins” three-quarters or more of the popular vote.”
Howard and Roessler (2006, 367): “Hegemonic authoritarian regimes do hold regular
elections as part of their system of governance, but in addition to widespread violations of
political, civil, and human rights, the elections are not actually competitive. Because no other
party, except the ruling one, is allowed to effectively compete (i.e., the opposition is completely
shut out from access to state-owned media coverage, banned from holding political rallies, or
forced into exile or in jail), the dominant candidate or party wins overwhelmingly, leading to a
de facto one-party state.”
Roessler and Howard (2009, 108): “In hegemonic authoritarian regimes the restrictions on
opposition parties and their political activities, bias in state-owned media coverage, and other
forms of repression so severely circumscribe contestation that the incumbent candidate or party
does not face the possibility of losing (Munck 2006, 33), often leading to a de facto one-party
state.”
Closed Regime
Howard and Roessler (2006, 367): “Closed authoritarian regimes are those in which a
country’s leaders are not selected through national elections, opposition political parties remain
banned, political control is maintained through the use of repression, and there is little space
for a free media and civil society.”
In order to highlight the concern about the discrepancies between conceptual-
ization and measurement of competitive/hegemonic regimes in earlier studies, Table
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3.2 and Table 3.3 present how our measurement of electoral dictatorships varies by
moving from ex ante competition to ex post competitiveness. In order to measure
ex post competitiveness, I used the World Banks’ Database of Political Institutions
(Keefer 2012) that is widely used in recent cross-national studies (Brownlee 2009;
Donno 2013). By using this data set, we can set 75% of votes (seats) as the thresh-
old of executive (legislative) elections in competitive authoritarianism and hegemonic
authoritarianism. That is, if a winner received more than 75% of votes (seats) in
an executive (legislative) election, that dictatorship is deemed a hegemonic regime
subsequently by presupposing that the victory with this wide margin stems from
the absence of ex ante competition. With this procedure, Table 3.2 shows that 4
cases in which ex ante competition was not allowed are wrongly classified as com-
petitive regimes. 30 elections with ex ante competition are considered as elections in
hegemonic regimes in which there is no possibility of losing. The discrepancies are
even more severe in legislative elections. While 8 cases are wrongly deemed elections
in competitive regimes, we treat 109 legislative elections as elections in hegemonic
regimes despite the presence of ex ante competition. What this implies is that the ap-
proaches that have been undertaken in earlier studies pick up a subsample of elections
in competitive regimes in which incumbents are particularly vulnerable. Therefore,
what has been found as the democratizing effect of this subset of elections is likely
an overestimate of the effect of competitive elections in nondemocratic settings on
regime change.
According to the above discussion, some might view that ex post competitiveness
of elections no longer has theoretical relevance. While it is true that it is not our
preferred approach to use ex post competitiveness to make an inference about and
measure the existence of ex ante competition in nondemocracies, an alternative way
of interpreting it is to understand ex post competitiveness as the signal about the
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Table 3.2: Executive Elections in Dictatorships, 1975–2014
ex ante ex post competitiveness
competition Competitive Hegemonic
Yes 79 30
No 4 13
Table 3.3: Legislative Elections in Dictatorships, 1975–2014
ex ante ex post competitiveness
competition Competitive Hegemonic
Yes 133 109
No 8 23
invincibility of dictatorships. Certainly, ex post competitiveness, which is usually
observed as the vote share and the seat share of the ruling group or party, is a noisy
signal since it is endogenous to many factors including electoral institutions, the
way in which elections were contested (harassment and intimidation of oppositions;
opposition’s boycott), the intensity of electoral manipulation such as vote buying and
gerrymandering, control over electoral commissions, and/or media bias in favor of the
regime. Regardless of what are the sources of ex post competitiveness of elections, this
is the information that becomes public knowledge, which then shapes the perception
of regime supporters and opponents. If the incumbent appears invincible, the stakes
are higher for elites in the ruling circle to defect as the regime is likely to survive
(Langston 2006, 60). This point is particularly important because serious contenders
to the regime are often former allies of the rulers (Bunce and Wolchik 2009, 256;
van de Walle 2006, 86). Moreover, dictatorships that show overwhelming electoral
victory discourage the formation of opposition coalitions as the opposition camps do
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not have a real chance of victory in the future (Donno 2013, 706; van de Walle 2006,
86). Taken together, the following expectation is obtained:
H3 Dictatorships in which election results demonstrate the invincibility of the
regimes are more likely to survive and are less likely to democratize than non-
electoral regimes.
This hypothesis implies that dictatorships that appear vulnerable in public be-
cause of the presence of viable oppositions are more fragile. It can also be argued,
however, that conducting elections reveals information about the regime support-
ers and opponents (Blaydes 2011; Magaloni 2006). And as the number of detailed
case studies has shown, by using that information, those dictatorships might resort
to momentary co-optation by distributing goods and patronage in order to prolong
their rule (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). If this electoral co-optation mechanism
is predominant and is a general phenomenon, we can expect that those seemingly
“vulnerable” regimes are in fact more likely to survive than their non-electoral coun-
terparts that do not have this option.
H4 Dictatorships in which election results signal the vulnerability of the regime
are more likely to survive and are less likely to democratize than non-electoral
regimes.
In sum, the two seemingly competing effects of elections are complementary el-
ements of the two bodies of the literature because they look at different aspects
of elections in nondemocratic settings. The distinction between ex ante electoral
competition and ex post competitiveness of elections makes this point clear. On the
one hand, individual elections can serve as a focal point and create a momentum
against the regime. On the other hand, what elections bring about can prolong the
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life of dictatorships. Separating the direct effect of elections from the effect of the
contexts that elections shape echoes the view that “elections are not the entire show
in the electoral autocracies” (van de Walle 2006, 85). In order to test the hypotheses
above, it is necessary to examine those two aspects of elections on regime outcomes.
For that purpose, I agree with Brownlee (2009) and Donno (2013) that we should
examine different contexts that are the products of elections. At the same time, I
also agree with the approaches taken by Lindberg (2009) and Teorell and Hadenius
(2009) that we should investigate the effect of individual elections.
3.4 Research Design and Data
In order to test my hypotheses about the consequences of elections in nondemo-
cratic settings, I constructed a data set that covers dictatorships from 1946 to 2010.
Empirical tests of the effect of individual elections on regime outcomes require high
precision about when elections were held and when a dictatorship began and ended.7
For that reason, the data are organized by regime-year. It means that if a country
experiences the fall of a dictatorship and if that dictatorship is immediately replaced
by another dictatorship in a given year, the country in question has an observation
for each dictatorship in that year. Information about dictatorships was obtained
from Geddes et al. (2013) since their data provide the start date and the end date
of each dictatorship. Data on individual elections were gathered from NELDA data
set (Hyde and Marinov 2012). Countries that lack sovereign status were excluded
from the sample by referring to Gleditsch and Ward (1999).
The first set of empirical tests is to see the impact of electoral competition ex ante
and ex post competitiveness of elections on the survival of dictatorships in general.
7Because of the high precision about timing of elections and regime failure that we require,
constructing a regime-month data set can be an alternative way to set up empirical studies (Schuler
et al. 2013). I chose to use regime-year observations so that my findings can be directly comparable
to past steadiest that rely on regime-year or country-year data.
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Table 3.4: Fall of Dictatorships and the Types of Regime Outcome, 1946–2010
Democratic Another Absence of
No Change Transition Dictatorship Government
Regime-Year 4612 82 101 40
In order to do so, I created a dichotomous dependent variable that is coded as “0”
if a dictatorship survives and is observed on December 31 of the relevant year. It
is coded as “1” if a regime collapses at any point in the relevant year.8 The second
set of empirical analyses examines the relationship between elections and democratic
transitions. In order to reflect the fact that the end of a dictatorship can lead
to either a democratic transition or the rise of another dictatorship, a categorical
dependent variable is coded as “0” if a dictatorship survives and is observed on
December 31 of the relevant year. This variable is coded as “1” if a dictatorship
collapsed and experienced a democratic transition at any point in the relevant year
and is coded as “2” if the fall of a dictatorship resulted in another dictatorship
or other instances of the absence of governments.9 Table 3.4 shows that among
223 breakdowns of dictatorships that happened between 1946 and 2010, 82 cases
were followed by a democracy, 101 by another dictatorship, 40 by the absence of
government, respectively.
8This part of empirical analyses is equivalent to Brownlee (2009)’s studies. He then subsampled
regime-years in which dictatorships broke down and assessed the impacts of electoral regime types
on democratic transitions. This approach ignores the possible selection effects and the findings
might be biased. This problem can be solved by applying, for instance, censored probit (Reed
2000). However, since poorly identified selection models can cause further problems (Brandt and
Schneider 2007) and multinomial logistic regressions can be estimated to test my hypotheses, I did
not apply selection models for my hypotheses tests.
9These “other instances” include countries that are ruled by warlords, are occupied by a foreign
country, are deemed provisional, and cease to exit.
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The first key independent variable is an indicator for individual elections that
allow ex ante competition. Here, elections refer to those for constituent assembly,
national executive office, and national legislative office. If there were multiple rounds
of elections, I included only the last round.10 By using the NELDA data set (Hyde
and Marinov 2012), I identified the cases in which there were at least one type of those
elections in the relevant regime-year.11 Competitive elections ex ante is coded as
“1” if there was at least one such election in which ex ante competition was allowed
and is coded as “0” otherwise. Similarly, noncompetitive elections ex ante is
coded as “1” if there was an election, but ex ante competition was not allowed. This
variable is coded as “0” otherwise. I adopted the Hyde and Marinov’s minimalist
definition of electoral competition. Therefore, an election is deemed as allowing
ex ante competition (1) if at least one opposition exists to contest the election,
(2) if multiple political parties are legal, and (3) if there is a choice of candidates
on the ballot.12 Since elections can happen anytime in a year, special treatments
should be made in the years in which dictatorships emerged and collapsed. In a
year when a new dictatorship was formed, I excluded any elections that happened
before that regime began. Likewise, in a year when a dictatorship fell, I excluded any
elections that were held after the end of that regime. By doing so, I excluded elections
that are not relevant to each dictatorship. Another caution is that some elections
unseated and replaced dictators and the date of those elections are considered as
the date of regime change. Those elections were counted in the data set, although
some exceptions apply. There were some elections that were primarily aimed at
10However, if the first round of elections already ended a dictatorship in Geddes et al. (2013)’s
data set, that round was counted. See Table 3.5 for the details.
11Since the NELDA data set does not distinguish between elections for the upper house and
elections for the lower house in the cases of bicameral system, all legislative elections in the national
level are included.
12Each condition is measured in the NELDA data set by variables that are named nelda3,
nelda4, nelda5, respectively.
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confirming transition processes. These elections usually happened after the date on
which dictatorships collapsed. However, in some cases, these elections were used as
the date of regime failure. Since they were planned for democratic transitions, we
should not assess the impact of these elections on regime outcome in order to avoid
tautology or overestimate the democratizing power of elections.13 Table 3.5 lists the
elections that were excluded from the analyses that follow. The decision was made
by referring to Geddes et al. (2013)’s rich documentation about the episode of regime
formation and failure that is available in their codebook. In order to assess the effect
of those individual elections on regime outcomes, these independent variables were
not lagged in the analyses.
The second key independent variable provides the information about the extent to
which the ruling circle prevails in dictatorships. Hegemonic regime ex post takes
the value of “1” if the ruling party’s vote (seat) share in the executive (legislative)
elections is greater than or equal to 75% and takes the value of “0” otherwise.14
Likewise, competitive regime ex post is coded as “1” if the ruling party’s vote
(seat) share in the executive (legislative) elections is smaller than 75% and is coded
as “0” otherwise. I used data that were collected by Svolik (2012).15 Since these
data represent the information as of January 1 of the relevant year, these variables
were not lagged in the analyses.
Control variables include subtypes of dictatorships, economic conditions, decade
dummies, and region dummies. Subtypes of dictatorships were obtained from Geddes
et al. (2013). Although their data acknowledge hybrids of these subtypes, I used the
four parsimonious categories of dictatorships: party-based regimes, military regimes,
13See Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009, 416) for the concerns about the causality and its direction of
elections on regime change in past research.
14Following Brownlee (2009, 525), monarchies are coded as hegemonic regimes.
15I also measured these two variables by using data that were collected by Keefer (2012) in order
to replicate some of the findings in the previous studies.
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Table 3.5: Elections that were Included and Excluded in the Empirical Analyses
Country Year Type Reasons
Included
El Salvador 1994 Executive The 2nd round was held after the regime failure. The 1st
round already indicates transition.
Guatemala 1995 Executive The 2nd round was held after the regime failure. The 1st
round already indicates transition.
Argentina 1973 Legislative The 2nd round was held after the regime failure. The 1st
round already indicates transition.
Poland 1989 Legislative The NELDA date of the 2nd round is wrong, which should
be June 18, 1989.
Syria 1947 Legislative The GWF date of regime failure seems wrong as the 2nd
round was held on July 18, 1947.
Excluded
Bolivia 1979 Executive Elections were followed by military’s return to barracks.
Honduras 1971 Executive Negotiated elections confirmed transition.
Nigeria 1999 Executive Elections organized by reformist incumbent led to demo-
cratic transition.
Paraguay 1993 Executive Elections organized by reformist incumbent led to demo-
cratic transition.
Ecuador 1979 Executive Elections organized by reformist incumbent led to demo-
cratic transition.
Ghana 1979 Executive Elections completed democratic transition.
Niger 1999 Executive Elections completed democratic transition.
Bolivia 1979 Legislative Elections were followed by military’s return to barracks.
Ecuador 1979 Legislative Elections organized by reformist incumbent led to demo-
cratic transition.
Germany, East 1990 Legislative Massive demonstration forced elections in which the incum-
bent lost.
Ghana 1969 Legislative Elections were followed by military’s return to barracks.
Ghana 1979 Legislative Elections completed democratic transition.
Honduras 1971 Legislative Negotiated elections confirmed transition.
Niger 1999 Legislative Elections completed democratic transition.
Nigeria 1999 Legislative Elections organized by reformist incumbent led to demo-
cratic transition.
Paraguay 1993 Legislative Elections organized by reformist incumbent led to demo-
cratic transition.
personalist regimes, and monarchies. Four dummy variables were created to represent
each subtype and personalist regimes were set as the reference category. These
variables represent the subtype in the relevant year, and therefore the variables
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were not lagged. Three variables capture economic conditions. First, the level of
economic development is measured by the natural log of GDP per capita. Economic
growth represents annual change in GDP per capita. These data were taken from
Bolt and van Zanden (2013), which is the update of Maddison (2008). The third
economic variable is the country’s dependence on oil revenue. The data were obtained
from Haber and Menaldo (2011). All economic indicators were lagged by one year.
Dummy variables that represent geographic regions were also taken from Haber and
Menaldo (2011). Region dummies include (1) Eastern Europe and Post-Soviet, (2)
North Africa and Middle East, (3) Subsaharan Africa, (4) Latin America, and (5)
Asia. Finally, dummy variables that capture decades were introduced. By setting
years after 2000 as the reference category, I incorporated six dummy variables that
represent decades from 1940s to 1990s.
Finally, following Carter and Signorino (2010), I included in the following analyses
a cubic polynomial of the duration of dictatorships. Although the Geddes et al.
(2013) data cover years from 1946 to 2010, they provide the start date if a regime
was formed before 1946. Therefore, the duration of dictatorships is left-censored and
dictatorships that were observed in 1946 can have different duration values depending
on their start date. The duration is counted for each dictatorship, and not for
the nondemocratic period. That is, if a dictatorship falls and another dictatorship
follows, they are considered two separate dictatorships. This approach has been
widely accepted in the recent studies since it does not ignore leadership changes in
dictatorships (Przeworski 2007) while it takes into account cases in which leaders
change but the same political coalition sustains (Svolik 2012, 185). In the analyses
that follow, standard errors were clustered by dictatorships, and not by countries.
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3.5 Findings/Results
In order to test my hypotheses about the effects of elections on the survival of
dictatorships, I estimated logistic regressions. The first column of Table 3.6 (Model
1) shows the baseline model that includes economic indicators, decade dummies,
region dummies, and time dependence. The second column (Model 2) estimates
the model that incorporates regime type variables. And the third column (Model
3) presents the full model in which the effect of elections with ex ante competition
and ex post competitiveness are assessed. The results show that, consistent with my
theoretical expectations, dictatorships are more likely to break down in the regime-
years in which elections with ex ante competition are held than in the regime-years
with no elections (H1). In a sharp contrast with this pattern, ex ante noncompetitive
elections have no impact on the regime survival. Not surprisingly, dictatorships that
demonstrate invincibility are less likely to lead to collapse than non-electoral regimes
(H3). Dictatorships in which viable oppositions exist are also found to outlast non-
electoral regimes (H4). Consistent with the findings in previous research, party-based
regimes are more durable while military regimes are more likely to fall. Economic
growth decreases the likelihood of breakdown. Dependence on oil revenue prolongs
the life of dictatorships as well. The fourth column (Model 4) estimated the full
model in which the measures of ex post competitiveness are based on the DPI data
set that the findings in the recent studies rely on (Brownlee 2009; Donno 2013).
By using the DPI data, the sample was restricted to years from 1975 to 2007. The
parameter estimate on ex post hegemonic regimes is negative, but is not statistically
significant. This was caused by the change from the Svolik data to the DPI data
for the measurement of this variable, and not by the change in the sample size.16 In
16Results are available upon request.
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Table 3.6: Elections and Breakdown of Dictatorships, 1946–2007
Dependent Variable =
Regime Failure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Competitive Elections ex ante 1.701∗∗∗ 1.685∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.230)
Noncompetitive Elections ex ante -0.300 -0.821
(0.416) (0.610)
Hegemonic Regime ex post -0.704∗∗ -0.457
(0.337) (0.312)
Competitive Regime ex post -0.760∗∗∗ -0.541∗∗
(0.294) (0.270)
Military Regime 0.736∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.279) (0.259)
Party-Based Regime -0.973∗∗∗ -0.699∗∗∗ -0.724∗∗
(0.218) (0.269) (0.326)
Monarchy -0.981∗∗ -0.579 -0.785
(0.438) (0.577) (0.698)
Lagged per capita GDP -0.081 -0.093 -0.018 -0.290
(Natural Log) (0.131) (0.126) (0.163) (0.180)
Lagged Economic Growth -0.032∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.029∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017)
Lagged Dependence -0.025∗ -0.028∗ -0.026∗ -0.011
on Oil Resource (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
Duration -0.024∗ 0.014 0.025 0.042∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.021)
Duration2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Duration3 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.343 -2.114∗ -2.636∗∗ -0.008
(1.062) (1.094) (1.335) (1.286)
N 4256 4256 3760 2518
N of clusters 262 262 235 176
Pseudo R2 0.047 0.081 0.120 0.153
Log pseudolikelihood -769.032 -741.215 -529.277 -406.245
Decade dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sampled Period 1946–2007 1946–2007 1946–2007 1975–2007
Logistic regression. Two-tailed tests. Standard errors are clustered by dictatorships.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
sum, the first set of empirical analyses show support for the idea that the regime-
destabilizing role of elections and the regime-sustaining role of elections are not
mutually exclusive, but complementary.
The second step of the empirical analyses is to see if ex ante electoral competition
and ex post competitiveness of elections affect democratic transitions in the way that
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I hypothesized. For that purpose, I estimated multinomial logistic regression models
for which the dependent variable has three distinct categories: “the regime survival
(base category),” “democratic transitions,” and “another dictatorship” that includes
the absence of governments. The first two columns (Model 1) of Table 3.7 show the
estimation results from the full model. Elections that allow ex ante competition
increase the probability of democratic transitions (H2) as well as the probability of
shifts to another dictatorship. Not surprisingly, elections that do not allow ex ante
competition decrease the chances of democratic transitions. Turning to the effects of
ex post competitiveness of elections (H3, H4), the coefficients on the two independent
variables are negative. They are statistically significant for transitions to another
dictatorship, but are not statistically significant for democratic transitions. That is,
although Model 3 in Table 3.6 shows that electoral regimes tend to be more stable
than non-electoral regimes, those regimes do not necessarily affect the likelihood of
democratic transitions—a particular type of regime outcomes. As for the control
variables, military regimes are more likely to experience democratic transitions and
party-based regimes are less likely to be replaced by another dictatorship. Economic
factors were found unrelated to democratic transitions. Model 2 in Table 3.7 presents
the results for the sample that was restricted in the same way as Model 4 in Table 3.6.
Elections with ex ante competition consistently increase the probability of democratic
transitions.
In order to illustrate the main findings, Table 3.8 presents the extent to which
the predicted probability changes with respect to the hypothesized factors.17 If
a dictatorship holds an election in which competition is allowed, the probability
17Table 3.8 is based on simulations using Clarify (Tomz et al. 2000). The simulated change
in the predicted probability of regime breakdown is based on Model 3, Table 3.6. The simulated
change in the predicted probability of democratic transitions is based on the first column of Model
1, Table 3.7. The values of all covariates were set to their median.
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Table 3.7: Elections, Regime Failure, and Subsequent Regime Type, 1946–2007
Dependent Variable = Model 1 Model 2
Regime Type Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship
Competitive Elections ex ante 2.916∗∗∗ 0.872∗∗∗ 3.131∗∗∗ 0.331
(0.484) (0.299) (0.412) (0.366)
Noncompetitive Elections ex ante -17.887∗∗∗ 0.181 -16.138∗∗∗ -0.699
(0.321) (0.422) (0.323) (0.633)
Hegemonic Regime ex post -0.184 -0.775∗∗ -0.711 -0.047
(0.529) (0.392) (0.529) (0.383)
Competitive Regime ex post -0.205 -1.024∗∗∗ -0.536 -0.421
(0.499) (0.397) (0.359) (0.417)
Military Regime 2.856∗∗∗ 0.083 2.685∗∗∗ 0.113
(0.773) (0.353) (0.675) (0.331)
Party-Based Regime -0.404 -0.774∗∗ -0.113 -0.830∗∗
(0.677) (0.300) (0.699) (0.364)
Monarchy -125.116 -0.244 1.382 -1.681
(240.149) (0.584) (1.254) (1.054)
Lagged per capita GDP 0.226 -0.277 -0.054 -0.629∗∗
(Natural Log) (0.293) (0.209) (0.233) (0.258)
Lagged Economic Growth -0.025 -0.030 -0.040 -0.042∗∗
(0.031) (0.018) (0.032) (0.018)
Lagged Dependence -0.021 -0.023 -0.016 -0.005
on Oil Resource (0.027) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017)
Duration 0.105∗ 0.002 0.046 0.043
(0.063) (0.044) (0.039) (0.053)
Duration2 -0.002 0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Duration3 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -7.337∗∗∗ -0.687 -4.643∗∗ 2.227
(2.538) (1.727) (2.204) (1.756)
N 3760 2518
N of clusters 235 176
Pseudo R2 0.174 0.212
Log pseudolikelihood -570.112 -442.154
Decade dummies Yes Yes
Region dummies Yes Yes
Sampled Period 1946–2007 1975–2007
Multinomial logistic regression. Two-tailed tests. Standard errors are clustered by dictatorships.
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
of breakdown increases by 23.5% while the probability of democratic transitions is
augmented by 17%. Electoral regimes are, in general, less likely to collapse than
non-electoral counterparts by 4%. The findings imply that, as has been suggested
by the case studies, elections can help the survival of dictatorships. At the same
time, however, the data also reveal that elections can be a moment for change—the
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Table 3.8: Changes in the Predicted Probability
Breakdown of Democratic
Dictatorships Transitions
Competitive elections ex ante H1: +23.5% H2: +17.0%
[+9.5, +40.5] [+1.9, +53.2]
Noncompetitive elections ex ante –1.6% –1.6%
[–8.1, +4.7] [–7.2, –0.1]
Hegemonic regimes ex post H3: –4.0% H3: –0.1%
[–11.1, –0.3] [–2.7, +2.4]
Competitive regimes ex post H4: –4.2% H4: –0.2%
[–10.7, –0.5] [–2.4, +1.5]
Note: The 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
findings consistent with the recent cross-national studies.
3.6 Implications and Conclusions
In this Chapter, I have developed and found empirical support for a theory about
the consequences of elections in nondemocratic settings. The earlier studies have
proposed two contrasting expectations with respect to elections. Evidence has been
mixed and inconclusive. In order to obtain a better understanding about what
elections bring about, I argue that electoral competition and competitiveness of elec-
tions reflect two distinct causal processes. On the one hand, the presence of electoral
competition even in limited degrees can offer an additional venue for changes by
functioning as a focal point, which in turn relates to the regime-destabilizing and
democratizing role of elections . On the other hand, competitiveness of elections
shapes the beliefs and strategic decisions of relevant actors in authoritarian politics.
The purported regime-stabilizing role of elections is closely associated with this as-
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pect of elections in nondemocratic settings. In this way, my theoretical explanations
imply that the two distinct views on elections are in effect mutually complementary.
And my empirical tests show that these two faces of elections exist simultaneously.
The existence of two separate forces of elections with respect the survival of
dictatorships and democratic transitions has broad implications for future studies
about the way in which elections function in dictatorships. As this Chapter shows,
there is a manageable portion of authoritarian politics that is in part shaped by
elections. Thus, under certain conditions, dictators and their allies should have a
strong incentive to keep holding elections. At the same time, however, there appears
to exist unmanageable parts of electoral politics that can generate risks for the regime
survival. Scrutinizing the trade-off and the dilemma that dictators and the ruling
elites might face will form a crucial building-block in answering questions as to when
and why some dictators suddenly declare themselves as president-for-life and stop
executive elections and when and why some dictatorships close national legislature
and quit further legislative elections.
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4. INFORMATIVE ELECTIONS IN NONDEMOCRACIES? ELECTIONS AND
POST-ELECTORAL REDISTRIBUTION REVISITED
4.1 Introduction
Why do we observe elections in nondemocracies? What motivates dictators to
hold elections? Do elections in such settings not lead to democratic transitions?
Recent scholarship has reached a general consensus that dictators have limited infor-
mation about the distribution of support for and potential threats to their regimes.
Following this logic, elections play an informational role and are a useful instrument
to reveal the geographic distribution of support and opposition. By using informa-
tion acquired from elections, dictators can strategically redistribute goods to max-
imize the chances of their survival (Lust-Okar 2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).
However, is it valid to assume that elections reveal such information exogenously
determined in society? The answer, I argue, is that elections generate the informa-
tion via strategic interaction between the dictator’s party, opposition politicians, and
voters.
The implicit premise in past research is that elections are informative (Blaydes
2011; Cox 2009; Magaloni 2006) and dictators use election results to shape post-
electoral provision of private benefits. But in the following pages, I argue that the
geographic distribution of support and opposition “revealed” by vote returns is the
product of the strategic interaction between the dictator’s party, opposition politi-
cians, and voters with heterogeneous preferences. That is, the empirical association
between vote returns and post-electoral provision of particularistic goods in non-
democracies reflects strategic calculation by these actors. Moreover, I argue that not
all elections in nondemocratic settings work the same way in terms of the information
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that they provide. Some elections will generate the information that dictators de-
sire and be called informative elections while the others will not. One possible factor
which distinguishes between informative and less informative elections is the absence
of opposition parties in the electoral contest. As is depicted in Figure 4.1, elections
generate information sought by dictators only if most of the major opposition par-
ties participate. In contrast, if the major opposition parties boycott elections, such
elections become less informative.
Figure 4.1: The Cause of Less Informative Elections in Nondemocracies
No electionsElections
Dictators
Do not participate
Less Informative
Participate
Informative
Major opposition parties
Identifying underlying mechanisms that generate informative and less informative
elections provides two theoretical contributions to the comparative politics literature.
First, the causal mechanism which links voting and rewarding in nondemocratic set-
tings helps answer the question about targeting post-electoral provision of private
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benefits. In this Chapter, I will provide a theoretical explanation about to whom the
incumbent party1 will likely offer particularistic goods. Second, the theory developed
in this Chapter enables me to account for both what has been explained and what
has been deemed as anomalous in the literature. That is, while informative elec-
tions give us an empirical association between votes and the provision of goods in a
manner consistent with past research, less informative elections explain instances in
which the geographic distribution of support and opposition is not associated with
post-electoral provision of particularistic goods in nondemocracies. This statement
does not imply that less informative elections are followed by no post-electoral re-
distribution of goods. Rather, I argue that the incumbent party’s decision of offering
benefits is not related to voters’ preferences as communicated by electoral results.
In the next section I will provide an overview of the information-collection role
of nondemocratic elections addressed in the literature and argue that elections in
nondemocratic settings are better understood as the information generation pro-
cess. Also, I emphasize the possibility that elections might not work uniformly in
nondemocracies especially when major opposition parties boycott elections. I then
summarize theories on distributive politics in old and new democracies which form
a building block of my formal analysis. In the third section, I develop a formal
model of distributive politics in nondemocratic settings and discuss its implications.
One theoretical prediction generated by my model is that when an opposition party
competes in elections, the incumbent party is more likely to offer rewards to its core
constituencies than weakly opposed voters. The model also predicts that in compari-
son to the core constituencies and weakly opposed voters, strongly opposed voters are
least likely to be the target of goods provision. Moreover, my formal model leads to
1Throughout this Chapter, terms such as the incumbent party, the ruling party, and the dicta-
tor’s party are used interchangeably.
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the expectation that the incumbent party will not rely on voters’ preferences when
deciding its target of rewards if the opposition party is absent from the electoral
contest. In the fourth section, I test the implications of my theory. I discuss my
case selection of Serbia in 1990s, introduce background information about Serbian
politics, describe my data, and present results from my empirical tests. The last
section concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
Elections in Nondemocracies as Information Generation Process
Why can elections be a useful instrument for dictators to maintain their rule? In
the most abstract sense, the premise is that elections play an informational role (Blay-
des 2011; Boix and Svolik 2007; Cox 2009; Magaloni 2006; Rozenas 2010). Elections
reveal who might be potential rivals of dictators within and outside the governing
group. For example, election outcomes might reveal information about resources
available for in-party elites to mobilize and the extent to which out-party elites are
popular and willing to challenge the regime. Hence, the information revealed through
elections facilitates dictators choosing a strategy to confiscate resources from poten-
tial rivals in order to deter future challenges.
An implicit assumption in this information-collection role of elections is that the
information revealed through elections is exogenously given. This assumption holds
as long as voters expect that elected politicians do not renege on their promise of the
provision of goods after elections. If voters anticipate that elected politicians might
not follow through on their promises, vote returns will not represent the distribution
of support for and opposition to the incumbent party. All these considerations are
irrelevant to elections in old or established democracies because electoral account-
ability is presumably assured. But it would be problematic in new democracies, and
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even more so in nondemocracies. I will discuss this point in greater detail below.
Recent research on vote-buying illuminates this point and calls attention to com-
mitment problems. Among others, Stokes (2005) contends that “perverse account-
ability” is at work in elections in new democracies. The incumbent party’s com-
mitment to post-electoral provision of goods is dubious from the voter’s perspective.
Therefore, in order to induce mutual cooperation between the party and the voter in
which the party offers private benefits and the voter votes for the party, both actors
commit to a grim trigger strategy. One implication drawn from this body of litera-
ture is that the geographic distribution of support and opposition to the incumbent
party is not exogenously determined. Instead, in these settings, the generation of
information is determined through the strategic interaction between the party and
the voters. In sum, we are not able to assume the information-collection role of
elections in nondemocracies, but need to scrutinize the mechanism with which the
information is generated.
If the information-collection role of elections in nondemocratic settings is dubi-
ous, how do we make sense of the empirical association between vote returns and the
provision of goods found in earlier research? My answer is to conceptualize elections
in nondemocracies as an information-generation process, and not an information-
collection device. For that purpose, building a formal model of elections and dis-
tributive politics in nondemocratic settings will shed new light on the working of
elections in nondemocracies.
Once we begin with an alternative conceptualization of elections in nondemo-
cratic settings as an information-generation process, another question is whether we
can think of a uniform strategic interaction between the dictator’s party, opposition
parties, and the voters. Since choices available to the voters are likely to affect the
nature of this interaction, I argue that the competitiveness of elections captured by
60
the presence or absence of opposition parties competing in elections is an important
factor.
In many cases, dictators cannot unilaterally decide the level of competitiveness of
elections because it is in part the product of a strategic interaction between dictators
and opposition politicians. For example, dictators attempt to design and implement
electoral systems which disproportionately favor them. Opposition politicians nat-
urally criticize such rules and attempt to negotiate concessions. Also, dictators can
try to manipulate vote returns by controlling mass media, intimidating opposition
politicians and their supporters, or controlling electoral commissions (Schedler 2002).
Under such circumstances, opposition elites often attempt to appeal to the interna-
tional community, especially international election observers, to increase the fairness
of elections. Another option for opposition elites is to boycott elections to discredit
the legitimacy of the regime. Regardless of whether dictators prohibit opposition
politicians from running in elections by intimidating them or opposition politicians
strategically boycott elections to discredit the legitimacy of the regime, the absence
of major opposition parties in electoral contests restricts the voters’ choice set. If
major opposition parties run for seats, voters can vote for the incumbent party, an
opposition party, or abstain. However, if the opposition does not compete, the voter’s
choice would be either to vote for the incumbent party or to abstain. Because of
this variation in strategic environment between the dictator’s party and the voters,
in the following formal analysis, I will examine two different types of strategic in-
teractions and show the variation in the information-generation process of elections
in nondemocratic settings contingent on the presence and absence of the opposition
parties.
To sum up the argument above, unlike the conventional premise, I argue that elec-
tions in nondemocracies are better understood as an information-generation process
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as opposed to an information-collection device. Moreover, the process by which the
information is generated varies depending on the presence or absence of major oppo-
sition parties in electoral competition (Figure 4.1). This argument implies that past
research has focused on one class of elections in nondemocracies, namely informative
elections in which these opposition parties compete (Blaydes 2011; Diaz-Cayeros et
al. 2003; Magaloni 2006). The following formal analysis shows the possibility of less
informative elections. And my empirical analysis demonstrates that less informative
elections lead to little empirical association between vote returns and post-electoral
provision of particularistic goods.
Redistributive Politics in Old and New Democracies
Theories on party competition and the redistribution of goods first evolved in the
literature on balanced-budget redistribution in established democracies. Scholars
have identified two distinct types of redistribution strategies that political parties
might take: mobilization and persuasion. On one hand, the core voter model ex-
pects that incumbent parties allocate more government spending or particularistic
goods to the areas or regions where the incumbent finds strong supporters (Cox and
McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996). On the other hand, the swing voter
model proposes that incumbent parties provide these goods to pivotal or swing voters
(Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996). The former scenario is cen-
tered on mobilization of incumbent supporters, while the latter is about persuasion
of pivotal or swing voters.
More recently, in the context of new democracies, both theories have been fur-
ther explored in the field of vote-buying. A key theoretical innovation in this body of
literature is that it explicitly takes account of commitment problems. That is, theo-
retical models of vote-buying deal with the possibility that the parties might renege
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on their offer of particularistic benefits once they win elections. Also, these models
allow for the possibility that voters can renege and vote for their preferred parties,
ignoring benefits that they received. Stokes (2005) first develops a formal model
that describes these commitment problems and concludes that weakly opposed vot-
ers—voters who prefer an opposition party to an incumbent party and whose policy
preference is close to the midpoint of the policy positions of these two parties—will
be the primary target of redistribution of particularistic benefits. However, Nichter
(2008) contends that the target of redistribution is not moderate opposition support-
ers, but potential incumbent supporters—those voters that have a policy preference
for the incumbent party, but abstained in the last election. Theoretical propositions
generated by the two different models per se are not mutually exclusive because the
authors posit different utilities for defecting or not voting for the incumbent party.
As a result, when the authors test their propositions against the same survey data
from Argentina, their theories are successful in explicating the reasons why about
24.4% of rewarded voters are weakly opposed voters (Stokes 2005) and why 64.5% of
rewarded voters are incumbent supporters (Nichter 2008).
In this Chapter, I have three objectives to develop our understanding of party
competition and redistribution of goods in nondemocratic settings. First, by setting
Stokes’ (2005) and Nichter’s (2008) models as a point of departure, I build a for-
mal model identifying conditions under which the dictator’s party opts to employ
a mobilization or persuasion strategy. Second, my model is distinct from previous
ones in that it explicitly represents electoral competition in nondemocratic settings.
Third, as an extension of my model, I provide a theoretical explanation of why less
informative elections result in the absence of a relationship between vote returns and
redistribution of particularistic goods.
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4.3 Theory
This section sets Stokes’ (2005) and Nichter’s (2008) models as a point of depar-
ture. By doing so, I will explore the causal mechanism by which the dictator targets
some types of voters for the provision of particularistic goods. One fundamental
change from the previous models is that voters have three choices in my model:
voting for the dictator, voting for the opposition party, and abstaining.2 This modi-
fication allows us to examine all voters in society with respect to their heterogeneous
policy preferences. At the same time, it enables us to see the voter’s trade-off be-
tween voting for the dictator and abstaining. The resulting model identifies different
conditions under which the dictator has an incentive to provide particularistic goods
to loyal voters, weakly opposed voters, and strongly opposed voters. While some of
the findings are consistent with the conclusions of Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008),
the model presented here also shows the condition under which the dictator has an
incentive to provide a private benefit to strongly opposed voters.
Assumptions
Following Stokes (2005, p.319), the model assumes a one-dimensional policy space
that maps policy positions of the dictator (x1), the opposition party (x2), and the
voter (xi) on the programmatic ground. Without the loss of generality, I assume
that x1 < x2. x
∗ ≡ (x1+ x2)/2 denotes the midpoint of the policy positions between
the dictator and the opposition party. If a voter i casts her ballot, her utility is given
by
ui = −1
2
(xi − vi)2 + bi − ci
2In Stokes (2005), a voter can vote either for the incumbent party or the opposition party. In
Nichter (2008), a voter can either vote for the incumbent party or abstain. Note that their models
are formed to explain vote-buying in new democracies, and not in nondemocracies.
64
where vi = {x1, x2}. That is, vi represents her vote for either the incumbent party
or the opposition party. bi = {0, b} represents the value to the voter of the reward
provided by the incumbent party in exchange for votes, relative to the value of
voting according to the voter’s preferences. Consistent with Stokes and Nichter,
the model assumes a constant and positive b across all voters (b > 0). c ≥ 0 is
an additional parameter proposed by Nichter (2008, 23) that represents a constant
cost of voting across all voters. c can take the value of 0 so that it relaxes Stokes’
implicit assumption that voters do not incur any cost of voting. However, in the
following analysis, I assume c > 0 in order to distinguish the utility between voting
and abstaining.
The model considers an additional case in which a voter abstains. Her utility
from abstention is given by
ui = −1
2
(xi − x1)2 + bi.
Reflecting the context of nondemocracies, it can be safe to assume that the decision
of abstention, from the voter’s perspective, preserves status quo (i.e. the survival of
the authoritarian government). Therefore, the voter expects to receive programmatic
benefit from the status quo policy x1 relative to her own policy position, −12(xi−x1)2,
if she abstains.
The definition of the utility from abstention is different from Nichter’s one in two
important ways, but is not necessarily mutually exclusive.3 First, the objective of
the present model is to describe the strategic interaction between the dictator and
all voters with heterogeneous policy preferences in nondemocracies, while Nichter
focuses on the interaction between the incumbent and nonvoting supporters in new
3For Nichter (2008, 24), the utility of a voter who abstains and receives a private benefit is b
while the utility of a voter who abstains and does not receives a private benefit is 0.
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democracies. Second, the interpretation of the term, −1
2
(xi − x1), is different. In
the present model this term represents a programmatic benefit of the voter from the
status quo policy x1, whereas Nichter considers it as “an ideological cost of voting...
which is greater for individuals whose preferences diverge more from their preferred
party’s platform” (2008, 23).
The dictator obtains v > 0 if she receives a vote and expends b when it pays
a reward to a voter. I assume v > b since otherwise buying a vote is not rational
behavior for the dictator. Table 4.1 shows the normal form of the stage game.
Note that, since the opposition party is present and the voter has an option to
vote for it, this game represents competitive, and therefore informative, elections in
nondemocracies.
Table 4.1: Normal Form of a Game between the Dictator and a Voter in Informative
Elections
Dictator
Voter Reward No Reward
Vote for the Dictator −1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c, v − b −12(xi − x1)2 − c, v
Vote for the Opposition −1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c, −b −12(xi − x2)2 − c, 0
Abstain −1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b, −b −12(xi − x1)2, 0
Payoffs in each cell are for the voter and the dictator, respectively.
In contrast, Table 4.2 depicts non-competitive and less informative elections in
which the opposition party is absent in the electoral contest. In this case the voter’s
choice is constrained to two options: voting for the dictator or abstaining.
The model also adopts Stokes’ and Nichter’s monitoring assumptions. The dicta-
tor monitors, even imperfectly, the behavior of the voter (Stokes 2005, 320). However,
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Table 4.2: Normal Form of a Game between the Dictator and a Voter in Less Infor-
mative Elections
Dictator
Voter Reward No Reward
Vote for the Dictator −1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c, v − b −12(xi − x1)2 − c, v
Abstain −1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b, −b −12(xi − x1)2, 0
the probability of monitoring would not be constant across voters (Nichter 2008, 20–
21). The dictator monitors the action of opposition supporters with a probability p
while she monitors the action of her supporters with a probability q. Consistent with
Nichter (2008, 24), I assume q > p. The intuition behind this assumption is that the
dictator has to monitor both whether opposition supporters vote and whether they
choose her despite their policy preference, but the dictator only needs to monitor
whether loyal voters vote. Hence, inequality q > p depicts that monitoring turnout
is easier than monitoring turnout and vote decisions.
Note that the different monitoring probabilities (p and q) between the dictator’s
supporters and opposition supporters is only a valid assumptions in competitive elec-
tions. When elections are not competitive, the voter’s choice is restricted to voting
for the dictator and abstaining. In such a case, rewarding a voter is nothing more
than giving her an incentive to come to the polling station to cast her ballot. There-
fore, in this context, monitoring voters is equivalent to what Nichter calls turnout
buying. Consequently, in non-competitive elections, I assume a constant monitoring
probability q for all voters in society.
Finally, the model follows an assumption of an infinitely repeated game and the
dictator commits to a grim trigger strategy. That is, the dictator will give rewards to
a voter until she is found to renege, after which she will never offer reward. Also, as
67
Table 4.3: Types of Voters in Competitive/Informative Elections
Types of Voters Preference∗ Policy Position
Strongly Opposed Voters ui(VO) > ui(A) > ui(VD) x
∗ + c/(x2 − x1) < xi
Weakly Opposed Voters ui(A) > ui(VO) > ui(VD) x
∗ < xi < x∗ + c/(x2 − x1)
Loyal Voters ui(A) > ui(VD) > ui(VO) xi < x
∗
∗ VD: Vote for the Dictator. VO: Vote for the opposition. A: Abstain.
is explicitly stated by Nichter (2008, 24), the model assumes one-sided uncertainty,
and consequently “no conditions are analyzed in which [the dictator] chooses not
to cooperate.” To solve this infinitely-repeated game, I assume a constant discount
factor β ∈ [0, 1] for both the dictator and the voter.
Analysis
Competitive Elections in Nondemocratic Settings
I begin with a one-shot game of competitive elections in which a voter’s action is
perfectly observed by the dictator. The payoffs from this game are depicted in Table
4.1. Since abstaining always gives a larger payoff than voting for the dictator for all
voters because of the cost of voting, we are left to examine three different preference
orders of action of voters. Table 4.3 lists the three different types of voter. The
first group of voters prefers voting for the opposition party (VO) to abstaining (A)
to voting for the dictator (VD). The second group prefers abstaining to voting for
the opposition to voting for the dictator. And the last group prefers abstaining to
voting for the dictator to voting for the opposition.
A voter i receives a larger payoff by voting for the opposition party than abstain-
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ing if ui(VO) > ui(A). Note that b = {0, b}.
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c > −1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b,
or
1
2
{(xi − x1)2 − (xi − x2)2} = (x1 − x2)(x∗ − xi) > c
or
x∗ +
c
x2 − x1 < xi. (1)
I call voters whose policy preference is found in this range (1) strongly opposed voters.
Second, by solving inequalities ui(A) > ui(VO) and ui(VO) > ui(VD) we find
policy preference of weakly opposed voters. Their policy position falls into the range
x∗ < xi < x∗ +
c
x2 − x1 . (2)
Lastly, inequality ui(VD) > ui(VO) holds if
xi < x
∗. (3)
This indicates the range of policy preference of loyal voters.
The three types of voters identified above yield a Nash equilibrium in a one-shot
game (Table 4.1). The action profile which constitutes this equilibrium is {Vote for
the Opposition, No Reward} between a strongly opposed voter and the dictator. In
the case of a weakly opposed voter and a loyal voter, the action profile {Abstain,
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No Reward} generates a Nash equilibrium. These profiles are helpful to identify the
voter’s optimal strategy of deviation from mutual cooperation—the profile {Vote for
the Dictator, Reward}—in the following analysis of infinitely-repeated games.
The Case of Strongly Opposed Voters
Now I turn to solve the game of an infinite sequence of elections. As is assumed
above, the dictator commits to a grim trigger strategy and observes deviation from
voting for her with a probability p if a voter is a strongly opposed voter. Optimal
deviation strategy of the strongly opposed voter is to vote for the opposition party.
Hence, the condition for a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE from here on) in which
the strongly opposed voter votes for the dictator and receives the reward, supported
by a grim trigger strategy is
EUi(VD, VD, VD, ...) > (1− p)EUi(VO, VD, VD, ...) + p · EUi(VO, VO, VO, ...)
1
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
> (1− p)
{[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+
β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]}
+ p
{ 1
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
− β
1− β b
}
. (4)
Inequality (4) simplifies to
xi < x
∗ +
( pβ
1− β + pβ
)( b
x2 − x1
)
.
Therefore, the group of strongly opposed voters who will sell their votes in exchange
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for particularistic goods has policy preference, xi, which lies in the range:
x∗ +
c
x2 − x1 < xi < x
∗ +
( pβ
1− β + pβ
)( b
x2 − x1
)
. (5)
Inequality (5) holds if
x∗ +
c
x2 − x1 < x
∗ +
( pβ
1− β + pβ
)( b
x2 − x1
)
,
or
b >
1− β + pβ
pβ
· c = λc
where λ = (1− β + pβ)/(pβ). Hence the condition under which mutual cooperation
emerges between the strongly opposed voter and the dictator is
x∗ +
c
x2 − x1 < xi < x
∗ +
( pβ
1− β + pβ
)( b
x2 − x1
)
where b > λc. (6)
The Case of Weakly Opposed Voters
One difference from the case of strongly opposed voters is that the optimal devi-
ation for the weakly opposed voter is to abstain. Note that we can ignore the term,
−1
2
(xi − x1)2, to derive the condition for a SPE since this is constant across all the
strategy pairs: {Vote for the Dictator, Reward}, {Abstain, Reward}, and {Abstain,
No Reward}. The condition for a SPE in which the weakly opposed voter votes for
the dictator and receives the reward is
EUi(VD, VD, VD, ...) > (1− p)EUi(A, VD, VD, ...) + p · EUi(A,A,A, ...)
1
1− β (b− c) > (1− p)
{
b+
β
1− β (b− c)
}
+ p · b. (7)
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Inequality (7) simplifies to
b >
1− β + pβ
pβ
· c = λc. (8)
In sum, the condition under which mutual cooperation emerges between the weakly
opposed supporters and the dictator is
x∗ < xi < x∗ +
c
x2 − x1 where b > λc. (9)
The Case of Loyal Voters
Remember that the dictator’s monitoring probability is not identical between
loyal voters and opposition supporters. Although loyal voters follow the same opti-
mal deviation strategy with the weakly opposed voters, this assumption yields the
condition for a SPE in which the loyal voter votes for the dictator and receives the
reward:
EUi(VD, VD, VD, ...) > (1− q)EUi(A, VD, VD, ...) + q · EUi(A,A,A, ...),
and we obtain
b >
1− β + qβ
qβ
· c = φc (10)
where φ = (1−β+qβ)/(qβ). The condition under which mutual cooperation happens
between the loyal voter and the dictator is
xi < x
∗ where b > φc. (11)
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Non-Competitive Elections in Nondemocratic Settings
In the case of non-competitive elections (Table 4.2), the strategic interaction
between a voter and the dictator produces a different set of payoffs. First, the fact
that voters have no option of voting for the opposition party because it is absent
from the electoral contest renders voters’ policy positions irrelevant to their actions.4
In other words, there are no distinction across the three types of voters that are
meaningful in the case of non-competitive elections. Second, the one-shot game
depicted in Table 4.2 results in a Prisoner’s dilemma. That is, we find a single Nash
equilibrium in which the action profile is {Abstain, No Reward} for all types of voters.
Remember that I assume a constant q as a probability of monitoring turnout, the
condition for a SPE in which a voter votes for the dictator and receives the reward
is
EUi(VD, VD, VD, ...) > (1− q)EUi(A, VD, VD, ...) + q · EUi(A,A,A, ...)
1
1− β (b− c) > (1− q)
{
b+
β
1− β (b− c)
}
+ q · b. (12)
Equation (12) simplifies to
b >
1− β + qβ
qβ
· c = φc (13)
Table 4.4 summarizes all the conditions for the SPEs discussed in competitive elec-
tions and non-competitive elections. In the next section, I discuss the implications
of these findings.
4That is, we can suppress the term, − 12 (xi − x1)2, in all strategy pairs in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.4: Conditions for SPEs
Policy Position Constraint†
Competitive Elections
Strongly Opposed Voters x∗ + c
x2−x1 < xi < x
∗ + pβ
1−β+pβ · bx2−x1 b > λc
Weakly Opposed Voters x∗ < xi < x∗ + cx2−x1 b > λc
Loyal Voters xi < x
∗ b > φc
Non-Competitive Elections
All Voters — b > φc
† λ = (1− β + pβ)/(pβ). φ = (1− β + qβ)/(qβ). q > p
Empirical Implications
By examining the conditions which support the SPEs identified above, in this
section I discuss implications of the theoretical model. The model provides numerous
implications, but I will focus on three comparative statics following Stokes (2005, 321)
and Nichter (2008, 25).
1. Targeting in Competitive Elections. All types of voters—loyal voters,
weakly opposed voters, and strongly opposed voters—are found to be possible
recipients of rewards from the incumbent party. However, the findings also
imply that the possibility of receiving particularistic goods varies across these
types. This variation stems from the different possibilities of monitoring.
1.1. First, when we compare weakly opposed voters and strongly opposed voters,
since pβ
1−β+pβ increases in p (Figure 4.2), the range of targetable strongly op-
posed voters (x∗+c/(x2−x1) < xi < x∗+[pβ/(1−β+pβ][b/(x2−x1)]) shrinks
as p gets smaller ceteris paribus. Note that the range at which weakly opposed
voters are located (x∗ < xi < x∗+c/(x2−x1)) remains constant even if p varies.
This implies that, with a small p or monitoring ability, the incumbent party
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is more likely to target weakly opposed voters than strongly opposed voters.5
Therefore, Stokes’ assertion (2005, 321) that weakly opposed voters can be the
target of private rewards is maintained as long as p is sufficiently small.
1.2. Second, since λ and φ are decreasing functions of p and q, respectively (Figure
4.3), and q > p, loyal voters are more likely to be the target than opposi-
tion supporters. This proposition is partly consistent with Nichter’s finding
that the incumbent party is “most effective when targeting unmobilized strong
supporters” (2008, 25). Note that the present model analyzes both mobilized
and unmobilized loyal voters while Nichter focuses solely on unmobilized loyal
voters.
2. Targeting in Non-Competitive Elections. In contrast, the model im-
plies that there is no difference in targeting across the types of voters in non-
competitive elections. First, voters’ policy positions are no longer a relevant
factor by which the dictator makes decisions of rewarding. Second, since moni-
toring possibility q is constant across all types of voters, it does not differentiate
voters. Hence, the incumbent party might offer rewards to some voters, know-
ing individual policy positions. However, the decision does not depend on their
policy positions, ceteris paribus.
5More specifically, the condition under which a weakly opposed voter is more likely to be targeted
than a strongly opposed voters must satisfy inequality:[
x∗ +
c
x2 − x1
]
− x∗ >
[
x∗ +
pβ
1− β + pβ ·
b
x2 − x1
]
−
[
x∗ +
c
x2 − x1
]
c
x2 − x1 >
pβ
1− β + pβ ·
b
x2 − x1 −
c
x2 − x1 .
Solving for p, we obtain
p <
(1− β)2c
β(b− 2c) where b > 2c.
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Figure 4.2: Monitoring Ability and Targeted Types of Opposition Voter
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3. The Existence of Less-Informative Elections. If elections are competi-
tive, the resulting vote share of the incumbent party and the opposition party
is the product of strategic interaction between the incumbent party and voters.
That is, these elections generate the information about the geographic distri-
bution of support and opposition and are deemed informative. In contrast,
if elections are not competitive, the incumbent party has no incentive to dif-
ferentiate voters with respect to their policy preferences. Voters’ choice set is
restricted to voting for the dictator or abstaining. The resulting distribution of
support and opposition deviates from the one that can be obtained if elections
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Figure 4.3: Monitoring Ability and Targeting Loyal Voters over Opposition Voters
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are competitive, implying the existence of less informative elections.
4. Monitoring. In both competitive and non-competitive elections, since λ and
φ decrease in p and q, respectively (Figure 4.3), the effectiveness of targeting
rewards increases as the ability of the dictator to monitor increases. This
proposition is consistent with Stokes (2005, 321) and Nichter (2008, 25).
5. Reward Value. In both competitive and non-competitive elections, as the
value of the private reward, b, increases, the possibility of targeting rewards
increases. This proposition is in accordance with Stokes (2005, 321) and Nichter
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(2008, 25).
Hypotheses
The implications drawn from my model proposes empirically-testable hypotheses
about vote returns and post-electoral provision of particularistic goods in nondemoc-
racies. I focus on hypotheses about targeting in elections in nondemocratic settings.6
First, since loyal voters are more likely to be the target of the provision of particu-
laristic goods than opposition supporters:
H1: If major opposition parties participate in electoral contest, dictators allocate
more particularistic goods to incumbent strongholds.
Second, since weakly opposed voters are more likely to be the target of the pro-
vision of particularistic goods if the ability of monitoring them decreases:
H2: If major opposition parties participate in electoral contest and the ability of
monitoring opposition supporters is large, dictators allocate more particularis-
tic goods to opposition strongholds.
Third, since the absence of the opposition party leads to voters’ heterogeneous
policy positions as an irrelevant factor of the provision of particularistic goods:
H3: If major opposition parties are absent from the election, there will be no em-
pirical association between vote returns and the provision of particularistic
goods.
In the next section, I will test these hypotheses against subnational-level data
obtained from Serbia in the 1990s.
6Although one of the empirical implications discussed above is related to the monitoring ability,
I did not test it in the next section due to the lack of data that measure this concept. However, it
is worth scrutinizing whether the variation in invalid votes, for instance, represents the monitoring
ability.
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4.4 Research Design and Data
The last two decades have witnessed a growing number of “competitive” elections
in nondemocracies around the world (Howard and Roessler 2006; Magaloni 2010;
Schedler 2006). The experiences of Serbia between the collapse of communist rule in
1990 and the transition to democracy in 2000 provide the ideal setting for testing my
hypotheses about both informative and less informative elections and distributive
politics in nondemocratic settings. Serbia in the 1990’s is also an ideal case because
of data-availability given that collecting information about nondemocratic regimes
is often quite challenging (Tullock 1987, 31).
In this Chapter, I analyzed time-series cross-section data on vote returns in non-
democratic elections and an indicator of post-electoral provision of particularistic
goods in Serbia from 1992 to 1999. The unit of analysis is the municipality or
opsˇtina. Unlike past research which examines election results of one particular year
(Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2003; Magaloni 2006), the data I employed cover three consec-
utive elections for the national legislature. Introducing time-varying election results
gives my empirical findings more external validity. Moreover, in one election out of
the three covered in this study, the major opposition parties boycotted the elections.
Therefore, we can test the hypothesis (H3) about the empirical association between
vote returns and goods provision in the absence of opposition party participation.
The introduction of multiparty electoral contests in 1990 was marked as the
commencement of elections in Serbia.7 Slobodan Milosˇevic´—the leader of Serbian
Socialist Party (SPS)—attempted to maximize the vote share by taking initiative
to design electoral institutions in favor of his party. Moreover, vote fraud (Goati
2003, 207) and control of the media, local government organizations, and the police
7I excluded the 1990 election from the following empirical analysis since the vote return data
were not available at the municipality level.
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Table 4.5: Distribution of Seats and Election Boycott in Serbia
1990 1992 1993 1997
December December December September
Election Boycott No No No Yes
1) Government Parties∗ SPS (194) SPS (101) SPS (123) SPS (110)
SRS (73) ND (2) SRS (82)
2) Major Oppositions∗ SPO DEPOS SRS, DEPOS SPO (45)
DS DZVM DS, DZVM
DZVM DS (65) DSS
(34 in total) (65 in total) (123 in total)
3) Minor Oppositions∗ 10 parties (22) 4 parties (11) 1 party (2) 5 parties (14)
Total seats 250 250 250 250
Turnout (%) 71.49 (76.75) 69.72 61.34 57.40
Valid votes (%) 95.26 (95.85) 93.95 95.93 95.97
N of parties n.a. 104 84 89
Electoral System SMD List PR List PR List PR
(2 rounds) (Closed) (Closed) (Closed)
N of districts 250 9 9 29
∗ The number of seats in parentheses. DEPOS, DS, DZVM, and DSS boycotted the 1997
election. SPS: Socialist Party of Serbia, SRS: Serbian Radical Party, DEPOS: Democratic
Movement of Serbia, DZVM: Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, DS: Democra-
tic party, DSS: Democratic Party of Serbia, SPO: Serbian Renewal Movement, ND: New
Democracy.
(Thomas 1999, 131) were reported. Serbia in this period is therefore deemed a typical
example of electoral authoritarianism (Thompson and Kuntz 2004). Yet, the SPS
was unable to become a single majority party. For this reason, Milosˇevic´ formed
coalition governments throughout the 1990s. Table 4.5 shows the changes in the seat
share from the 1990, 1992, 1993, and 1997 legislative elections.
The 1997 election was distinct from the previous elections in that the major op-
position parties boycotted. The members of the DEPOS coalition, Democratic Party
(DS) and Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) decided to boycott8 while Serbian Rad-
ical Party (SRS) and the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), which was a member
8DEPOS dissolved after 1993 and the former members formed Zajedno (Together) coalition in
1996 which ran the local election of the year.
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of DEPOS in the 1993 election, competed in the election.9
According to my proposed theoretical framework, the first three elections are
supposed to be informative, and therefore are expected to show an empirical associ-
ation between vote returns and the provision of particularistic goods. However, since
the major opposition parties boycotted the 1997 election, this election provides an
instance of a less informative election. Consequently, vote returns are not expected
to be related to the provision of goods.
In order to test the hypotheses discussed above, I analyzed time-series cross-
section data of the Republic of Serbia from 1992 to 1999. The unit of analysis is
the municipality (opsˇtina). All data used in the analysis were taken from official
records of election results of the national legislature (narodna skupsˇtina) and annual
report of municipalities collected by Statistical Office of Serbia (Republicˇki Zavod za
Statistiku Srbije).
The type of goods distributed after elections can take different forms. In past
research, scholars focus on, for example, employment in local government (Alesina
et al. 2000), resource transfer to local governments (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2003),
revenue sharing funds allocated to municipalities (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2003), ex-
penditures in social spending (Magaloni 2006), and disbursement of infrastructure
development resources (Blaydes 2011). In this Chapter, I used an indicator of job
allocation in the public sector as the dependent variable, which was measured by the
number of employees in the public administration. This approach is valid because
post-electoral provision of particularistic goods can take a form of providing jobs by
dictators. Gordy (1999, 58) notes:
9Although there were attempts of election boycotts by some opposition parties in 1990 and
1993 to blame unfair conduct of elections, they finally decided to participate in elections since
they believed that the boycott tactic was effective only if it was a unanimous action by opposition
parties (Thomas 1999, 73, 183). That is, opposition parties had failed to solve the collective action
problem.
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...in a state where political party membership has economic consequences,
the ruling party does in fact rule. Hence throughout 1995 and 1996, in a
period in which SPS’s public support continued to decline, its member-
ship increased, and this increase was publicized in ceremonies in which
new members were admitted to the party, reports of which appeared in
regime-controlled newspapers and on the state television news program.
The secret? The leader of a local SPS branch explained, “[W]hat do you
expect when SPS has something to offer?” An opposition leader in the
same area explained it differently by saying that his party counsels its
supporters to join SPS “if a job is in question” and hopes that in the
next election the ruling party will have “fewer votes than member.”10
According to my theory, the change in job allocation in the public sector is
the function of election results in Serbia. I used the number of employees as the
dependent variable while including the dependent variable lagged by one year as an
independent variable. The data were obtained from Municipalities in the Republic
of Serbia (Opsˇtine u Republici Srbiji).11
In order to test the hypotheses developed above, I constructed indices of party
control by using official records of vote returns at the municipality level (Republicˇki
Zavod za Statistiku Srbije 1993, 1994, 1997). First, I created an index which repre-
sents the strength of government parties. For each municipality, I calculated the sum
of votes received by government parties and divided it by the number of registered
voters. Similarly, to estimate the effect of the strength of major opposition parties,
I summed up the number of votes obtained by the major opposition parties defined
10Italic added by the author. The comments of local politicians are cited from Vreme no. 275,
January 1996, p.11.
11The original name of the variable is drusˇtvenopoliticˇke zajednice i organizacije reported in the
section of zaposleni u drusˇtvenom sektoru po delatnostima.
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above and divided it by the number of registered voters. The resulting variable rep-
resents the party control of the major opposition parties. Note that, since there are
minor opposition parties in the legislature as well as parties which could not obtain
seats, these two indicators of party control are not perfectly collinear. Consistent
with other models of budgetary behavior (Stasavage 2005; Whitten and Williams
2010), all independent variables were lagged by one year.
Election boycotts happened only in the 1997 election in my sample. The 1993
election record shows that all major opposition parties such as DEPOS, DS, and DSS
ran in all municipalities. Therefore, I consider that the effect of election boycott
uniformly manifests in the years after 1997. I created a dummy variable which
takes the value of “1” in the years between 1997 and 1999. It takes the value
of “0” otherwise. To test the hypothesis that less informative elections lead to
no empirical association between vote returns and goods provision, I constructed a
series of interaction terms between this dummy variable of election boycott and the
indicators of party control.
I included five control variables in the empirical analysis. The first variable is
the percent change in the income per capita and the second is the percent change
in the number of unemployed (of both public and private sectors) in the munici-
pality. Since the change in income per capita and the change in the number of the
unemployed during a year might affect the change in the public sector employment,
I controlled for the impact of both economic factors. The third control variable is
population density. A higher population density would represent the level of urban-
ization across municipalities and a more urbanized municipality would need more
local public servants. I constructed this measure by dividing population of each mu-
nicipality by the land size (km2). All data were obtained from Opsˇtine u Republici
Srbiji (Municipalities in the Republic of Serbia).
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Another two control variables are dummy variables which indicate if a munic-
ipality belongs to an autonomous province of Serbia, that is, either Vojvodina or
Kosovo. These dummy variables were included in the analyses in order to control
for unobserved factors that are unique to each province. On the one hand, Vojvo-
dina is located in the northern part of Serbia where Hungarian minorities reside.
Those Hungarian minorities formed minority parties (including DZVM) and were
consistently in opposition to the authoritarian governments in Serbia. On the other
hand, Kosovo is found in south and more than 90% of population are ethnic Albani-
ans. The majority of those Albanian citizens consistently boycotted elections in part
because they attempted to achieve independence of Kosovo from Serbia. In Serbia
during 1990s, out of 190 municipalities, 45 municipalities belonged to the Vojvodina
autonomous province and 30 municipalities were found in the Kosovo autonomous
province.
4.5 Findings/Results
In this Chapter I applied OLS regressions with panel-corrected standard errors
and a lagged dependent variable. First, I included all independent variables and
control variables except population density (Model 1). Since population density
had missing values in some municipalities, I ran another model which includes this
variable (Model 2). The purpose of this step was to see if the parameter estimates
are sensitive to the listwise deletion. Model 1 and Model 2 assumed common AR1
process across panels. Second, in Model 3 and Model 4 I tested the same empirical
models from Model 1 and Model 2 with an alternative assumption of error process,
respectively. I assumed panel-specific AR1 process in Model 3 and Model 4. The
results were not sensitive to this alternative model specification.
Table 4.6 shows parameter estimates of all independent variables and interaction
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Table 4.6: Post-Electoral Provision of Particularistic Goods in Serbia, 1992-1999
OLS with Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Independent Variable Hypothesis1) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Incumbent Strength H1(+) 0.345∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.131) (0.178) (0.169)
Opposition Strength H2(+) 0.615∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.185) (0.243) (0.234)
Election Boycott 64.076∗∗ 62.493∗∗∗ 70.790∗∗∗ 72.799∗∗∗
(25.709) (22.275) (25.897) (23.920)
Incumbent Strength -0.490∗ -0.476∗ -0.633∗∗ -0.661∗∗
× Election Boycott (0.294) (0.268) (0.292) (0.285)
Opposition Strength -0.655∗∗ -0.620∗∗ -0.717∗∗ -0.673∗
× Election Boycott (0.312) (0.302) (0.357) (0.365)
Income per capita (percent change) -0.012 -0.016 -0.288 -0.313
(0.251) (0.251) (0.240) (0.236)
The Number of the Unemployed -1.662 -2.146 -2.510 -3.710
(percent change) (3.776) (3.548) (3.494) (3.343)
Population Density -0.002 -0.002∗
(0.002) (0.001)
Vojvodina -8.599∗∗ -9.431∗∗∗ -8.756∗∗ -10.082∗∗∗
(3.991) (3.560) (4.017) (3.550)
Kosovo 7.698 7.336 5.360 5.352
(7.900) (7.073) (5.669) (4.784)
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.999∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 1.001∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007)
Constant -41.506∗∗ -36.592∗∗ -57.709∗∗∗ -50.931∗∗∗
(16.479) (14.797) (19.162) (18.359)
Assumptions on error process AR1 Panel Specific AR1
N 1206 1131 1206 1131
N of municipalities 189 178 189 178
Wald χ2 30.25 1846.09 26.29 88.65
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1) Expected signs of the coefficients are in parentheses.
Dependent variable is the number of employee in the public administration.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Marginal Effects of Party Control across Informative and Less Informative
Elections in Serbia, 1992–1999
Hypothesis1) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Informative Elections
Incumbent Strength H1(+) .345∗∗ .298∗∗ .593∗∗∗ .523∗∗∗
(.156) (.131) (.178) (.169)
Opposition Strength H2(+) .615∗∗∗ .581∗∗∗ .731∗∗∗ .711∗∗∗
(.204) (.185) (.243) (.234)
Less Informative Elections
Incumbent Strength H3(β = 0) -.145 -.178 -.040 -.138
(.488) (.367) (.853) (.531)
Opposition Strength H3(β = 0) -.040 -.039 .015 .038
(.861) (.868) (.954) (.888)
1) Expected signs of the coefficients are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
terms. Overall, the results are not sensitive to a possible sampling bias. In order
to facilitate the comparison of the effect of key independent variables between in-
formative elections and less informative elections, Table 4.7 reports the estimated
effects of these variables. For less informative elections, I calculated the marginal
effect of each independent variable and standard error. First, Table 4.7 (upper panel)
provides support for the mobilization of core voters (H1). Also the sign of the coeffi-
cient for opposition stronghold is positive and statistically significant. This finding is
consistent with H2. Although we do not have a direct measure of the ability to mon-
itor opposition supporters in Serbia, the findings suggest that the ability to monitor
strongly opposed voters was not that small, and therefore SPS had incentive to target
these voters. Second, once the election boycott occurred, however, vote returns and
job allocation are not supposed to be related (H3). Table 4.7 (lower panel) shows
the marginal effect of party control variables in the absence of the major opposition
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Figure 4.4: Marginal Effects and Confidence Intervals of Party Control across Infor-
mative and Less Informative Elections in Serbia, 1992–1999 (Model 1, Table 4.7)
Opposition Strength (LI)
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parties. Consistent with my expectation, the effect of the strength of the incum-
bent parties and the major opposition parties disappears after the less informative
elections.
Turning to Figure 4.4 that displays the parameter estimates and the 95% con-
fidence intervals of Model 1 graphically, it is clear that the pattern between the
incumbent strength and job allocation is present after informative elections (Row
1), but is not after less informative elections (Row 2). The same applies to the
opposition strength (Row 3 and Row 4).
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4.6 Implications and Conclusions
Although recent scholarship illuminates the role of elections in nondemocracies,
the validity of the assumption about the information collection role of such elections
had not been thoroughly explored. In this Chapter, I introduced an alternative view
of elections in nondemocratic settings as information generation processes. I argue
that the geographic distribution of support for and opposition to the incumbent
party is not exogenously given as has been assumed, but it is generated via strategic
interaction between the party and voters in elections. That is, unlike the premise of
past research that elections per se are informative, I maintain that elections become
informative once competitiveness of elections increases even in nondemocracies.
This alternative view of nondemocratic elections as information-generation pro-
cesses provides implications for empirical association between vote returns and post-
electoral provision of particularistic goods in nondemocracies. One theoretical im-
provement that is achieved by this new insight is that it identifies conditions under
which the dictator’s party offers private benefits to some group of voters over an-
other, while maintaining the possibility that any type of voters with respect to their
policy preferences are possible targets for the provision of private benefits. Moreover,
the theory developed in this Chapter provides an explanation of why the absence of
the opposition from nondemocratic elections renders voters’ heterogeneous policy
preferences irrelevant to the incumbent party’s allocations of private benefits, which
has been a mere anomaly in light of past theoretical explanation.
Empirical analysis of the implications of my theoretical model with data obtained
from Serbia in the 1990s largely confirms the association between vote returns and the
provision of particularistic goods. First, loyal or core constituencies were primarily
offered private benefits. Second, strongly opposed voters were also targeted because
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the ability of monitoring them was not low for the Socialist Party of Serbia. Finally,
once major opposition parties boycotted elections, the empirical association between
vote returns and the allocation of private benefits disappeared, which is consistent
with my theoretical expectation.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The three preceding Chapters were all aimed at answering one of the most im-
portant questions about authoritarian politics today: why do dictatorships hold
elections? In what follows, I summarize the core findings of each Chapter. I then
discuss my future agenda.
In Chapter 2, I developed a theory about the causes of contested elections in dic-
tatorships. An implicit premise in the literature has been that anticipated benefits
with respect to regime survival give dictators an incentive to hold elections. However,
whether dictators are able to benefit from elections is not perfectly predetermined.
Given the uncertainty that is inherent in holding contested elections, the literature
on the role of elections remains inconclusive about the causes of those elections. In
order to better understand when and why dictators decide to hold elections, I argue
that the distinction should be made between the types of elections, and more specif-
ically, who get elected. On the one hand, elections for the effective executive can be
used to prevent violent ouster of dictators, and thereby can work as an institution-
alized means of leadership succession. On the other hand, legislative elections select
regime allies and are primarily aimed at cooptation and elite unity. On a sample of
dictatorships from 1946–2008, I found strong support for my theory about the causes
of contested elections.
In Chapter 3, I proposed a theory about the consequences of elections in non-
democratic settings. Earlier studies are largely divided into the two distinct views
about the effects that elections generate. One body of the literature suggests that
elections destabilize dictatorships and increase the probability of democratic tran-
sitions. Another body of the literature claims that elections prolong the tenure of
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dictatorships. While these views look competing and mutually exclusive on the sur-
face, I argue that they are in effect complementary with each other. The reason is
that the two bodies of the literature look at different aspects of elections in non-
democratic settings. On the one hand, individual elections can create a momentum
for changes since they work as a focal point in which ruling elites split, opposition
forces unite, and these actors challenge the regime. On the other hand, election
results play an informational role and can shape authoritarian politics in a way that
helps the survival of dictatorships. I tested my hypotheses about the consequences
of elections with data that cover dictatorships after World War II and found robust
evidence that supports both claims.
In Chapter 4, I revisited the information collection role of elections in nondemo-
cratic settings. An implicit assumption in past research has been that elections are
informative and dictators use election results to shape the post-electoral provision
of goods and patronage. I argue instead that the geographic distribution of sup-
port and opposition “revealed” by vote returns is not exogenously given, but is the
product of the strategic interaction between the ruling party, opposition politicians,
and voters with heterogeneous preferences. In other words, unlike the premise of
past research that elections per se are informative in dictatorships, I maintain that
elections become informative once competitiveness of elections increases. Moreover,
I contend that not all elections in nondemocratic settings work the same way with
respect to the information that they provide. Some elections generate the infor-
mation that dictators desire and should thus be called informative elections while
others do not. One possible factor which distinguishes between informative and less
informative elections is the absence of opposition parties from the electoral contest.
I built a formal model in order to show the causal mechanism that I outlined above.
I also tested implications that are drawn from my theoretical model by analyzing
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a municipality-level data set of Serbia during 1990s. My findings showed strong
support for the post-electoral redistribution of goods after informative elections as
well as the existence of less informative elections which generate very different post-
electoral distribution of goods.
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of the dissertation provide new insights on the causes
of elections as well as the consequences of elections. Remaining issues that I will
explore in future work are the reasons why some dictatorships keep holding contested
elections while others do not and the timing of elections in dictatorships. The vast
majority of dictatorships repeat elections while there are a small number of cases
in which, for instance, elected dictators became president-for-life (e.g., Jean-Claude
Duvalier in Haiti and Niyazov in Turkmenistan). It might be the case that becoming
president-for-life creates succession problems and causes the possibility of violent
ouster as is implied by Chapter 2. Otherwise, according to Chapter 3, it is plausible
that dictators who face small risks in manipulating ex ante competition have little
to no incentive to close the electoral arena. Empirical tests of these claims require
a data set with high precision in election records, and therefore it is left for the
future project. This data set in effect allows us to examine whether or not dictators
manipulate election timing in their favor. To my knowledge, there have been no
studies that answer this question in a systematic way. But this question is worth
exploring because the manipulation of election timing is likely to undermine the
effectiveness of foreign aid and election monitoring that are intended to promote
democratic transitions and the protection of human rights.
Another possible and straightforward extension to this dissertation is to study
local elections in dictatorships. It seems unlikely that elections at the local level
directly cause democratic transitions, since the opposition victory in a city or village
might not have much leverage to the regime as a whole. Yet, some of the earlier
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case studies point to their importance with respect to the behavior of elites inside
and outside of the ruling circle (Langston 2006). In this regard, those elections can
be considered another important element that shapes authoritarian politics, which
in turn affects regime survival and democratization.
Lastly, all three Chapters speak to how elections are related to important mat-
ters in authoritarian politics: institutionalization of leadership selection and coop-
tation (Chapter 2), the relationship between dictators and elites (Chapter 3), and
distributive politics (Chapter 4). Implications on these issues will improve our un-
derstandings of interworking of dictatorships, and help explain the variation in the
effectiveness and the stability of a wide range of economic and social policies that are
implemented in dictatorships—for instance, fiscal, monetary, labor, land, regional de-
velopment, health, welfare, education, environmental, and housing policies. Hence,
with the knowledge that is obtained from this dissertation and by further scrutinizing
the dynamic of policymaking in dictatorships, future research can better explain a
wide variety of issues including rapid economic growth in China, improved access to
safe water in Argentina, hyperinflation and bankruptcy in Zimbabwe, miserable life
expectancy in North Korea, and decreased childhood disease immunization rates in
Nigeria.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE GAMES FOR CHAPTER 4
Informative Elections
Types of Voters
Since the voter has three different options, six preference orders are logically
possible. However, abstaining always gives larger utility than voting for the dictator
by assumption, we only need to examine three preference orders:
1. ui(VO) > ui(A) > ui(VD)
2. ui(A) > ui(VO) > ui(VD)
3. ui(A) > ui(VD) > ui(VO)
where VD denotes voting for the dictator, VO voting for the opposition party, A ab-
staining, respectively.
Strongly Opposed Voters
The condition which satisfies ui(VO) > ui(A) > ui(VD) is obtained by examining
the condition under which ui(VO) > ui(A) since inequality ui(A) > ui(VD) holds by
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assumption. ui(VO) > ui(A) if and only if:
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c > −1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b
1
2
(xi − x1)2 − 1
2
(xi − x2)2 > c
1
2
(x2i − 2xix1 + x21 − x2i + 2xix2 − x22) > c
1
2
{(x21 − x22)− 2xi(x1 − x2)} > c
1
2
{(x1 + x2)(x1 − x2)− 2xi(x1 − x2)} > c
1
2
{(x1 − x2)(2x∗ − 2xi)} > c
(x1 − x2)(x∗ − xi) > c
x∗ − xi < c
x1 − x2
x∗ − c
x1 − x2 < xi
x∗ +
c
x2 − x1 < xi (1)
Note that x∗ ≡ (x1 + x2)/2 and x1 − x2 < 0 by assumption. Define the voter whose
policy preference xi lies in the range x
∗ + c
x2−x1 < xi as strongly opposed voters,
because her policy preference is most far away from the dictator’s policy position x1
relative to other types of voters on the one-dimensional spectrum.
Weakly Opposed Voters
The condition which satisfies ui(A) > ui(VO) > ui(VD) is obtained by examining
the conditions under which ui(A) > ui(VO) and ui(VO) > ui(VD) hold simultaneously.
From equation (1), we now know ui(A) > ui(VO) if and only if:
xi < x
∗ +
c
x2 − x1 (2)
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ui(VO) > ui(VD) holds if and only if:
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c > −1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
1
2
(xi − x1)2 − 1
2
(xi − x2)2 > 0
(x1 − x2)(x∗ − xi) > 0
x∗ − xi < 0
x∗ < xi (3)
Equations (2) and (3) show another group of voters whose policy preference falls into
the range x∗ < xi < x∗ + cx2−x1 . I call this group of voters weakly opposed voters in
comparison to strongly opposed voters.
Loyal Voters
The condition which satisfies ui(A) > ui(VD) > ui(VO) is given by solving
ui(VD) > ui(VO). From equation (3) this inequality holds if and only if:
xi < x
∗ (4)
I call this group of voters loyal voters.
Equilibria
Strongly Opposed Voters
For strongly opposed voters, the optimal choice is to vote for the opposition party.
Remember that the dictator monitors the action of the voter with a probability p.
Therefore, in infinitely repeated plays, the voter has two sequences of strategy to
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play. First, she can vote for the opposition party in the first stage and if it is not
found by the dictator (with a probability 1 − p), she can switches to voting for the
dictator in subsequent periods. Second, she can vote for the opposition party in the
first stage, but it is monitored by the dictator. In such a case, the voter keeps voting
for the opposition party knowing that the dictator will never offer reward regardless
of her action.
In an infinite sequence of elections, given that the dictator commits to a grim
trigger strategy and keeps offering a reward, expected utility of a strongly opposed
voter from keep voting for the dictator is:
EUi(VD, VD, VD, ...) =
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
+ β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
+ · · ·
=
1
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
.
Expected utility of a strongly opposed voter from voting for the opposition party in
the first period but the defection is not monitored by the dictator, and then switches
to voting for the dictator is:
EUi(VO, VD, VD, ...) =
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+ β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
+ · · ·
=
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+
β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
.
Expected utility of a strongly opposed voter from voting for the opposition party in
the first period and the defection is monitored by the dictator, and then keeps voting
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for the opposition party in subsequent periods is:
EUi(VO, VO, VO, ...) =
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+ β
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 − c
]
+ · · ·
=
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+
β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 − c
]
=
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+
β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
− β
1− β b
=
1
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
− β
1− β b.
The condition for a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in which a strongly opposed
voter votes for the dictator and receives the reward, supported by a grim trigger
strategy is
EUi(VD, VD, VD, ...) > (1− p)EUi(VO, VD, VD, ...) + p · EUi(VO, VO, VO, ...)
1
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
> (1− p)
{[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+
β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]}
+ p
{ 1
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
− β
1− β b
}
. (5)
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The right hand side of equation (5) is
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+ (1− p) β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
+p
{ 1
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
−
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
− β
1− β b
}
=
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+ (1− p) β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
+p
{ 1
1− β
([
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
− (1− β)
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
− βb
)}
=
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+ (1− p) β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
+p
β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 − c
]
Therefore, equation (5) is equivalent to
1
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
− (1− p) β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
>
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 + b− c
]
+ p
β
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 − c
]
1− β + pβ
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
>
1− β + pβ
1− β
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 − c
]
+ b[
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + b− c
]
>
[
−1
2
(xi − x2)2 − c
]
+
1− β
1− β + pβ b
−1
2
(xi − x1)2 + 1
2
(xi − x2)2 >
( 1− β
1− β + pβ − 1
)
b
(x∗ − xi)(x1 − x2) < pβ
1− β + pβ b
x∗ − xi > pβ
1− β + pβ ·
b
x1 − x2
xi < x
∗ − pβ
1− β + pβ ·
b
x1 − x2
xi < x
∗ +
pβ
1− β + pβ ·
b
x2 − x1 .
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Therefore, the group of strongly opposed voters who will sell their votes in exchange
for particularistic goods has policy preference, xi, which lies in the range:
x∗ +
c
x2 − x1 < xi < x
∗ +
pβ
1− β + pβ ·
b
x2 − x1 . (6)
The condition under which equation (6) holds is:
x∗ +
c
x2 − x1 < x
∗ +
pβ
1− β + pβ ·
b
x2 − x1
c <
pβ
1− β + pβ · b
b >
1− β + pβ
pβ
· c = λc. (7)
where λ = (1 − β + pβ)/(pβ). Equations (6) and (7) jointly provide the condition
under which a strongly opposed voter sells her vote in exchange for private benefits.
Weakly Opposed Voters
For a weakly opposed voter, the best strategy is to abstain. In infinitely repeated
plays, she can abstain in the first stage and if it is not found by the dictator (with a
probability 1−p), she can switches to voting for the dictator in subsequent periods. If
she is found to renege with a probability p, the voter will keep abstaining in following
stages because the dictator commits to the grim trigger strategy.
In an infinite sequence of elections, given that the dictator commits to a grim
trigger strategy and keeps offering a reward, expected utility of a weakly opposed
voter from keep voting for the party is obtained as follows. Note that voting for the
dictator and abstaining both give the same programmatic benefit, and therefore we
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can suppress the term, −1
2
(xi − x1)2, in the analysis.
EUi(VD, VD, VD, ...) = (b− c) + β(b− c) + · · · = 1
1− β (b− c).
Expected utility of a weakly opposed voter from abstaining in the first period but the
defection is not monitored by the dictator, then switches to voting for the dictator
is:
EUi(A, VD, VD, ...) = b+ β(b− c) + · · · = b+ β
1− β (b− c).
Expected utility of a weakly opposed voter from abstaining in the first period and
the defection is monitored by the incumbent party, then abstaining in subsequent
periods is:
EUi(A,A,A, ...) = b+ β · 0 + · · · = b.
The condition for a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in which a weakly opposed
voter votes for the dictator and receives the reward, supported by a grim trigger
strategy is
EUi(VD, VD, VD, ...) > (1− p)EUi(A, VD, VD, ...) + p · EUi(A,A,A, ...)
1
1− β (b− c) > (1− p)
{
b+
β
1− β (b− c)
}
+ p · b. (8)
And inequality (8) simplifies to
b >
1− β + pβ
pβ
· c = λc. (9)
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Therefore, all weakly opposed voters—voters whose policy preferences lie in the
range, x∗ < xi < x∗ + c/(x2 − x1)—can be the target of the provision of partic-
ularistic goods as long as equation (9) holds.
Loyal voters
A loyal voter faces the same strategic environment with a weakly opposed voter
in that her optimal strategy is to abstain. One difference between them is that the
monitoring probability for the loyal voter is q as opposed to p. Note that q > p by
assumption.
The condition for a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in which a loyal voter
votes for the dictator and receives the reward, supported by a grim trigger strategy
is found to be similar to the condition (9) except the monitoring probability.
EUi(VD, VD, VD, ...) > (1− q)EUi(A, VD, VD, ...) + q · EUi(A,A,A, ...)
1
1− β (b− c) > (1− q)
{
b+
β
1− β (b− c)
}
+ q · b. (10)
Inequality (10) simplifies to
b >
1− β + qβ
qβ
· c = φc (11)
where φ = (1− β + qβ)/(qβ).
Less Informative Elections
In the case of non-competitive elections, the strategic interaction between a voter
and the dictator shows a different picture. First, the fact that voters have no option
of voting for the opposition party because it is absent from the electoral contest
renders voters’ policy position irrelevant to their action. In other words, there is
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no distinction across the three types of voters that are meaningful in the case of
competitive elections. Second, the one-shot game depicted in Table 2 results in a
Prisoner’s dilemma. That is, we find a single Nash equilibrium in which the action
profile is {Abstain, No Reward} for all types of voters. Remember that I assume a
constant q as a probability of monitoring turnout, the condition for a SPE in which
a voter votes for the dictator and receives the reward is
EUi(VD, VD, VD, ...) > (1− q)EUi(A, VD, VD...) + q · EUi(A,A,A, ...)
1
1− β (b− c) > (1− q)
{
b+
β
1− β (b− c)
}
+ q · b. (12)
Equation (12) simplifies to
b >
1− β + qβ
qβ
· c = φc (13)
where φ = (1− β + qβ)/(qβ).
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